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IN Tll I:: SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ELROY TILL MAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19000 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Should this Court address the issue of whether the 
jury panel in defendant's case fairly represented racial and 
ethnic minorities; and if it does, has defendant met his burden 
of showing that the jury panel in his case was defective in this 
regard? 
2. Did the trial court err in excluding polygraph 
evidence at both the guilt and penalty phases of defendant's 
trial? 
3. Should this Court review the allegedly improper 
remarks of the prosecutor in the absence of a contemporaneous 
obJection at trial to those remarks; and, if it does, do those 
remarks require reversal of defendant's conviction or sentence? 
4. Does the general verdict, from which it cannot be 
determined whether the jury unanimously found at least one of 
:• veral underlying felonies charged for first degree murder in 
this case, entitle defendant to a reversal of his conviction? 
5. Does the merger doctrine as applied to felony 
murder prohibit a conviction of first degree murder when the 
underlying felony circumstance is incidental to the murder? 
6. Was the evidence sufficient to show that defendant 
committed murder while engaged in the comm1ss1on of a burglary? 
7. Is UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 ( 2) (Supp. 1983) 
unconstitutional because it allows the jury to consider facts 
in aggravation during the penalty hearing? 
8. Was defendant's death sentence disproproportionate? 
9. Is defendant entitled to another penalty hearing 
based upon allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor 
concerning the length of a life sentence? 
10. Did defendant waive objection to the reasonable 
doubt instructions given at the guilt and penalty phases of his 
trial; and, if he did not, were those instructions 
constitutionally infirm? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Elroy Tillman, was charged by information 
with first degree murder, a capital offense, under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-5-202 Cl978) (amended 1983) CR. 17). After a jury trial, the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged on January 14, 1983 
CR. 212). After a penalty hearing on January 20, 1983, the jury 
decided to impose the death penalty on defendant CR. 226). The 
trial court then sentenced defendant to death by shooting (R. 
350-351). 
-2-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts, which are derived from the 
•v1dence presented by the State, support the jury's verdict. 
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on May 26, 1982, Craig Jones 
was awakened by the smell of smoke. Unable to locate the source 
of the smoke, he went back to bed. Two hours later while 
dressing for work, Jones noticed smoke pouring through the back 
bedroom window of his neighbor's home. Jones went over to the 
house, entered it through the open front door, and made his way 
to the bedroom th rough very dense smoke. Mark Schoenfeld was 
lying on a smoldering bed. When there was no response to his 
urgings to get up, Jones realized that Schoenfeld was dead (R. 
496-500). 
An autopsy of Schoenfeld showed that the victim's lower 
body was severely burned <primarily his 1 egs and feet l and that 
blisters covered most of his body. Although the burns were 
severe and might have resulted in death, the primary cause of 
death was asphyxiation from carbon monoxide poisoning (R. 515-
516, 52ll. In addition, the autopsy revealed that Schoenfeld had 
been bludgeoned repeatedly with a blunt instrument, which caused 
severe skull fractures and bruises and lacerations to the brain. 
In the medical examiner's expert opinion, the injuries were 
consistent with repeated and extremely hard blows from the blunt 
side of an ax (R. 517-519, 531). Blood was found on the pillow 
under the victim's head and spattered on the wall (R. 538). 
Although the head injuries did not result in Schoenfeld's 
immediate death, the resulting brain damage would have been fatal 
-3-
independent of the fire (R. 518, 527, 541). Death occurred 
between midnight and 4:00 a.m., the heat from the fire making it 
impossible to pinpoint the exact time of death. 
An arson investigation determined that the fire had 
been deliberately set. It originated at the edge of Schoenfeld's 
mattress near the victim's feet. Cigarette butts had been 
scattered on the bed and floor as if to suggest the victim had 
been careless while smoking in bed. However, there were no 
scorch marks under the butts, indicating that they were not 
burning when scattered. Moreover, the mattress itself suggested 
the fire had only one point of origin <R. 574-577, 588-589, 592). 
If the bedroom door had been left open, the fire would likely 
have engulfed the entire top floor. However, the fire burned out 
due to lack of oxygen and most of the damage was confined to the 
back bedroom (R. 579, 593). 
Conversations with Lori Groneman, defendant's former 
girlfriend, led the police to defendant (R. 1360). Ms. Groneman 
and defendant had had a tumultuous relationship from 1977 until 
January 1982 CR. 652-659, 670-672). In the summer of 1980, 
during one of the "off" periods of the relationship, defendant 
threatened to kill Ms. Groneman and made several threatening 
phone calls to her residence CR. 717-718). Ms. Groneman 
testified that she was afraid of defendant and had actually used 
a police escort when she broke up with him in August 1980 (R. 
742-743). 
Defendant and Ms. Groneman resumed their relationship 
in late 1980 or early 1981. However, Ms. Groneman attempted to 
-4-
terminate the relationship permanently in January 1982. After 
ll1ng defendant that she did not wish to see him again, Ms. 
"L''neman began to receive harrassing phone calls from him. 
u1ir i ng one of these calls, defendant threatened to blow-up the 
Groneman family. On another occasion, defendant told Ms. 
Groneman that he knew where to get a machine gun and how to use 
it. TWice during the early spring of 1982, defendant told Ms. 
Groneman that he never forgot and that when she least expected 
it, he would catch her unaware and carry out his threats CR. 752-
7 88) • 
Not all the threatening calls to Ms. Groneman came from 
defendant. Some were placed by a female who Ms. Groneman later 
identified as Carla Sagers, defendant's girlfriend. A tracer 
placed on the Groneman's phone revealed that the calls were 
placed from Ms. Sagers's number and the number assigned to a 
residence owned by the Schribners, other friends of defendant (R. 
846, 1180-1189, 1236-1242, 1502). 
Ms. Groneman started dating Mark Schoenfeld in February 
1982. They were not living together, but did have an intimate 
sexual relationship <R. 664). Ms. Groneman was unaware of any 
threats by defendant toward the victim; however, she observed 
defendant following her and Schoenfeld on at least three 
occasions in the months preceding the homicide at Sperry Univac 
where both Schoenfeld and Ms. Groneman worked (R. 602-608, 670-
r, 12, 887-891). 
On May 25, 1982, Ms. Groneman left work with Schoenfeld 
J11d went to his house for dinner. They arrived there between 
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5:30 and 6:00 p.m. She did not notice anything unusual or see 
defendant that evening. Schoenfeld took her home at 
approximately 11:00 p.m. She had no further contact with him (R. 
695-709). 
Based upon the information received from Ms. Groneman, 
the police picked up defendant for questioning on May 26, 1982, 
the day Schoenfeld's body was discovered. After defendant was 
read his "Miranda" rights, he agreed to make a statement. He 
said that he had spent the previous evening with Ms. Carla 
Sagers. They had driven to Pineview Reservoir, leaving his 
apartment between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. and returning around 
midnight. When they returned, defendant's roommate was already 
in bed. Ms. Sagers spent the night at defendant's apartment. 
Defendant specifically denied knowing Mark Schoenfeld or having 
been anywhere near Schoenfeld's neighborhood during the evening 
or early morning hours of May 25-26 (R. 1308-1315, 1320-1326, 
1357-1358). 
Carla Sagers left for California on business the 
morning of May 26, 1982. The police picked her up at the airport 
upon her return May 28. During the first hour of questioning, 
Ms. Sagers confirmed defendant's alibi (R. 987, 1300). When 
police confronted Ms. Sagers with information that a threatening 
call to Ms. Groneman had been traced to Ms. Sagers's phone 
number, she completely broke down and changed her story (R. 1145, 
1306-1307). 
Ms. Sagers testified that she first became involved 
with defendant in the fall of 1980. During the early months of 
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defendant began pressuring Ms. Sagers to make anonymous 
,11s to Ms. Groneman (R. 865-869, 1001-1009). About this same 
time, defendant began to complain that Ms. Groneman was hassling 
him. He talked about poisoning Ms. Groneman in order to get rid 
of her (R. 902-907, 1027). However, he decided to kill Mark 
Schoenfeld instead (R. 1027). 
Defendant and Ms. Sagers obtained Schoenfeld's name and 
address from a new car sticker on a car they recognized as 
Schoenfeld's parked at Sperry Univac. After obtaining the 
address, they drove past Schoenfeld's home fairly often (R. 887-
891). Sometime in April 1982, defendant and Ms. Sagers went to 
Schoenfeld's residence when he was not home and Ms. Sagers peered 
through the windows to establish the layout inside. She also 
asked the downstairs tenants how many people lived upstairs and 
telephoned Schoenfeld's phone number to determine whether he had 
any roommates (R. 911-915). 
Defendant considered several alternative methods of 
killing Schoenfeld. He made and tested a bomb with which he 
intended to blow up Schoenfeld's car an idea he later rejected 
as unworkable (R. 894-901, 907-909). Poison was also considered 
rn. 902-907). In addition, Ms. Sagers purchased two handguns at 
defendant's request in April and May of 1982. Defendant said 
lhctt he was going to make a silencer for the revolver and shoot 
(R. 870-885). Several weeks prior to Schoenfeld' s 
death, defendant and Ms. Sagers drove to Schoenfeld's residence, 
intending to shoot him. Ms. Sagers was able to prevent the 
murder on that occasion (R. 920-924). 
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Shortly after Ms. Sagers arrivPd home from work on May 
25, defendant came over and asked her to go back to work and 
check out a government vehicle, which she did. Defendant took 
the government car to his apartment, and Ms. Sagers returned to 
her home to prepare for an upcoming business trip. She then went 
to defendant's home at approximately 6:30 p.m. with the intention 
of spending the night CR. 936-939) • Ms. Sagers and defendant ran 
a quick errand and returned to his apartment for dinner. While 
at the apartment, defendant told Ms. Sagers that this was the 
night Schoenfeld would be killed. After dinner they left in the 
government car and drove to Schoenfeld's house CR. 94-944, 1072-
1073). When they arrived, Schoenfeld's car was parked in front 
of the house. They parked a short distance down the street where 
they could watch the house. About an hour later, they left and 
drove around for awhile, but returned and again parked outside 
Schoenfeld's residence and watched. Sometime between 10:00 and 
10:30 p.m. they decided to go over to Ms. Sagers's apartment. 
Twenty minutes later, they arrived at Schoenfeld's for the third 
time, just as two people got into Schoenfeld's car and drove off 
(R. 946-951). 
While Schoenfeld was away, Ms. Sagers and defendant 
walked around to the rear of the house. Defendant climbed onto 
the back porch and Ms. Sagers handed him a short-handled ax. 
Defendant entered the house and remained there for approximately 
an hour. During that time, Schoenfeld returned. Defendant came 
out of the house and told Ms. Sagers he had not had the 
opportunity to kill Schoenfeld and that Schoenfeld was awake in 
the bedroom (R. 953-960). 
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Approximately thirty minutes passed before defendant 
,.,: Ms. Sagers returned to the house and sneaked in Schoenfeld' s 
, 1nnt door. Because defendant wanted to be sure Schoenfeld was 
asleep, they sat on the front room floor and waited for what Ms. 
Sagers estimated to be an hour. They then proceeded to the 
bedroom. Defendant wore gloves and carried the ax. He told Ms. 
Sagers to be sure to tuck her hands inside her sweater before she 
touched anything. After opening the bedroom door and finding 
that it was too dark to see, defendant went to the kitchen and 
briefly turned on a light. He then went back to the bedroom and 
crawled inside (R. 961-967, 1111-1115). 
Once in the bedroom, defendant whispered for Ms. Sagers 
to turn on the kitchen light. While she was in the kitchen, Ms. 
Sagers heard defendant hit the victim with the ax. She stayed in 
the kitchen for a few moments, then turned off the light and went 
back to the bedroom where defendant had turned on a light. She 
saw Schoenfeld lying on the bed and defendant wiping blood off 
the wall with a towel (R. 968-969, 1121). Defendant had Ms. 
Sagers hand him a piece of clothing that was on the floor, which 
he put over Schoenfeld's head. Thinking defendant was going to 
hit Schoenfeld again, Ms. Sagers left the room. She heard 
defendant hit the victim a second time (R. 970, 1122-1123). 
When Ms. Sagers returned to the bedroom, defendant 
':anded her the towel and ax. Pursuant to Ms. Sagers' s suggestion 
a fire would help cover up the crime, defendant then ignited 
the mattress with his lighter and scattered cigarette butts from 
a nearby ashtray onto the floor and the bed. He said that he 
-9-
wanted Schoenfeld dead and wondered about hitting him again, but 
Ms. Sagers replied that she thought the (ire would take care of 
it. After defendant closed the bedroom door, he and Ms. Sagers 
left the victim's house through the front door, taking with them 
the towel, ax and other article of clothing (R. 971-978, 1138, 
1148-1153). 
From Schoenfeld's house, the two drove out the old 
airport road, stopping to burn the towel and clothing taken from 
the victim's home. They then drove along Redwood Road to where 
it crosses the Jordan River and threw the ax into the river. As 
it fell, Ms. Sagers heard the ax strike something metal. They 
continued on Redwood Road towards Bountiful, and as they drove 
Ms. Sagers threw the gloves defendant had been wearing out the 
window (R. 979-983, 1129-1132). 
After disposing of the evidence, defendant and Ms. 
Sagers returned to defendant's apartment. They did not see or 
speak to anyone when they arrived there. They checked their 
clothing for blood stains and then went to bed. Ms. Sagers left 
the apartment at approximately 7:30 a.m. and later that day 
departed on her business trip (R. 983-985). 
The ax was never recovered. However, a Woods Cross 
police officer testified that a little over a month prior to the 
murder he pulled defendant over and saw an ax lying on the floor 
behind the driver's seat. Defendant told the officer that he 
used it as a hammer when working on his car (R. 642-650). 
Investigators also discovered a gash in the insulation of a pipe 
running on the west side of the bridge off which Ms. Sagers 
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, t if ied the ax was thrown. The gash appeared to have been 
,,,isecl by a sharp object (R. 1294-1295). Pursuant to Ms. 
,agers's directions for recovery of certain items of evidence, 
police officers found a piece of burned terrycloth and what 
looked to be part of a shirt along the old airport road. They 
al so found a pair of gloves at the side of Redwood Road about a 
mile north of the Jordan River bridge (R. 989, 1264-1272, 1340-
13 41) • 
In exchange for her testimony at trial, the State 
granted Ms. Sagers immunity from prosecution for her involvement 
in the death of Mark Schoenfeld (R. 8-9). Her testimony provided 
the bulk of the evidence against defendant. 
Although defendant did not testify at trial, he 
presented some evidence in his defense. His chief witness was 
his roommate, Mark Welch, whose testimony mainly concerned 
defendant's good character. However, Welch testified that he had 
never seen defendant with an ax (R. 1500-1502). He confirmed Ms. 
Sagers's story that she had come to dinner on May 25, noting that 
Ms. Sagers seemed upset but that defendant behaved in a perfectly 
normal fashion (R. 1505-1508). He also confirmed that defendant 
and Ms. Sagers went into the bedroom for a private conversation. 
They left at approximately 7:30 p.m., defendant telling Welch 
tl1al they were going to drive up to Pineview Reservoir. 
Defendant returned alone between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., and he and 
Welch watched television for a short time. Welch did not see Ms. 
Sagers after dinner that night, but the suitcases for her 
11pcoming trip were there at his and defendant's apartment. Welch 
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testified that he was not aware of anyone entering or leaving the 
apartment after defendant returned (R. 1510-1514); however, he 
admitted that it would be possible to enter or leave the 
apartment without waking him and that he really did not know 
whether Ms. Sagers had stayed over that night <R. 1537). Welch 
also did not notice a green government car in the parking lot, 
but agreed that the apartment parking lot was large and he would 
not have had any reason to notice that particular car (R. 1504, 
1545). 
After hearing the evidence, the jury found defendant 
guilty of first degree murder. During the penalty phase of the 
trial, the State, in addition to relying on evidence presented at 
guilt phase, presented evidence of defendant's prior convictions 
CR. 1867-1884, 1935, 1938-1939) .1 The defense presented several 
character witnesses including defendant's mother, wife, brother 
and roommate CR. 1887-1923). The jury returned a verdict for the 
death penalty (R. 226). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court need not address the issue of whether the 
jury panel in defendant's case fairly represented racial and 
ethnic minorities. Defendant's counsel apparently believe that 
this is a meritless issue. Moreover, even if the Court were to 
1 Several exhibits documenting defendant's prior criminal record 
were received at the penalty hearing <R. 225). Those exhibits 
were not made part of the record on appeal. The State, 
subsequent to the filing of this brief, will file a motion to 
supplement the record with those exhibits. 
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"1ru;s the issue, defendant has not met his burden of showing 
,,,Judicial error in the empaneling of the jury. 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
excluding polygraph evidence from both the guilt and penalty 
phases of defendant's trial. Its decision in this regard should 
not be reversed. 
By failing to object to certain allegedly improper 
remarks made by the prosecutor at both the guilt and penalty 
phases of trial, defendant failed to preserve the issue for 
appeal. Alternatively, the prosecutor's remarks do not require 
reversal because they did not render defendant's trial or penalty 
hearing fundamentally unfair. 
Although it cannot be determined from the general 
verdict whether the jury unanimously found at least one of the 
underlying felonies charged for first degree murder in this case, 
that is not grounds for reversal. 
The merger doctrine as applied to felony murder does 
not prohibit a conviction of first degree murder when the 
underlying felony circumstance is an integral part of, or merely 
incidental to, the murder. A fair reading of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-5-202(1) (d) (1978) (amended 1983) does not suggest a 
'egislative intent to restrict the operation of the statute in 
'"hat manner. 
The evidence showed that defendant committed murder 
while engaged in the commission of a burglary, which is a 
"rnntinuing" offense for the purpose of § 76-5-202(1) (d) • 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (2) (Supp. 1983) is not 
unconstitutional because it allows the jury to consider .a.n:i facts 
in aggravation during penalty hearing. Consideration of any 
facts in aggravation is not unconstitutional as long as the 
evidence presented fairly contributes to a more informed 
sentencing decision. 
Defendant's sentence was not disproportionate because 
an accomplice received immunity or because the facts of his crime 
were not sufficiently egregious. Also, he was not entitled to 
have the jury consider the sentences imposed in other capital 
cases in Utah before it determined his sentence. 
Because defendant made no objection at the penalty 
hearing to allegedly improper remarks made by the prosecutor 
concerning the length of a life sentence, and because those 
remarks constituted permissible rebuttal to defense counsel's 
argument, defendant is not entitled to another penalty hearing. 
Because defendant failed to object to the reasonable 
doubt instructions he himself requested be given at both the 
guilt and penalty phases of his trial, he waived any objection to 
those instructions. Furthermore, the instructions were not 
constitutionally infirm. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant has raised ten points of alleged error in 
this appeal. In responding to each of those points, the State 
will not necessarily address them in the order they are presented 
in defendant's brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER THE JURY PANEL IN DEFENDANT'S CASE 
FAIRLY REPRESENTED RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
MINORITIES; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT 
HAS SHOWN NO ERROR IN THIS REGARD. 
In Point X of Appellant's Brief (pp. 84-88), 
defendant's counsel raise the issue of underrepresentation of 
racial and ethnic minorities on the jury panel in defendant's 
case. However, they raise the issue apparently believing that 
they are required to do so under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
738 11967), and State y. Clayton, Utah, 639 P.2d 168 11981). 
Based upon their citation to those cases, it must be assumed that 
counsel believe there is no appealable issue on this point. 
Therefore, it is not clear why counsel included the point. If 
counsel did so to protect themselves from a possible ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, this was unnecessary. It is well 
settled that counsel need not raise every non-frivolous issue on 
appeal. Jones y. Barnes, _U.S._, 103 s.ct. 3308 11983). Thus, 
it certainly is not necessary to raise meritless issues in an 
appellate brief that is not an "Aruie..1:..s." brief. 
If counsel intended for the Court to address the issue, 
defendant failed to preserve it for review by not complying with 
the procedures for challenging the jury contained in UTAH CODE 
§ 78-46-16 (Supp. 1983) and UTAH CODE ANN. 
77-35-18 11982). 
Moreover, defendant has not satisfied the three-prong 
test set forth in Duren y. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 11979), for 
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evaluating whether the fair cross-section requirement has been 
violated: (1) that the group represents a distinctive group in 
the community, (2) that the group's representation is 
unreasonably disproportionate, and (3) that the challenged 
underrepresentation is due to a systematic exclusion in the 
selection process. 439 U.S. at 364. s.e_e .al..s..Q State v. Leggroan, 
25 Utah 2d 32, 35, 475 P.2d 57, 59 (1970); United States y. Test, 
550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976); State y. Bernal, 137 Ariz. 421, 
425-426, 671 P.2d 399, 403-404 Cl983). Defendant's reference to 
data presented in State y. Gary Arthur Bishop, CR 83-1314, which 
has not been made part of the record in this case, is not a 
sufficient showing under the above standard. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF POLYGRAPH 
EVIDENCE AT BOTH THE GUILT AND PENALTY 
PHASES OF DEFENDANT'S TRIAL WAS NOT ERROR. 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed 
reversible error first when it refused to allow him to present at 
the guilt phase of his trial evidence of a polygraph examination 
of the State's chief witness, Carla Sagers, and again when it 
refused to allow presentation of that evidence at the penalty 
phase. 
A. GUILT PHASE 
Prior to trial, Sergeant Kenneth Thirsk, an officer 
with the Salt Lake City Police Department, conducted two 
polygraph examinations of Ms. Sagers. The first was inconclusive 
CR. 1713), but the second indicated deception (R. 1708). 
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r1pfendant's motion to admit the results of the second examination 
"' the guilt phase of his trial was denied (R. 89). However, 
;qt. Thirsk was permitted to testify about the substance of his 
interviews with Ms. Sagers, provided he made no mention of a 
polygraph examination CR. 1583). The following is a portion of 
Sgt. Thirsk's testimony: 
Q. Did you have occasion at that time to 
discuss with Miss Sagers various aspects 
of this case? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. Would you, Officer, be so kind as to tell 
the jury and the Court the content of that 
conversation as best you can recall, 
relating to your questions and her answers 
in response thereto? 
A. The conversation regarded Carla's particular 
activities herself during the incident at 
Mark Schoenfeld's home. During that 
conversation at one point I told her that I 
did not believe her answers to my questions 
and told her that I believed she had in fact 
struck Mark and I made that accusation. 
Q. Did she respond to that accusation? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. And what was her response? 
A. Her response was, "If you want me to say 
I hit him, I will." 
I then said, "I don't want you to say that 
unless it's the truth. Tell me what 
happened. n 
She said, "I will testify that I hit him 
if that's what you want." 
I then asked her, "How many times did you 
hit him," and she responded, "Twice." 
I then asked, "Which side did you hit him?" 
She said, "The left side." 
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I then asked, "Which sidP of the bed were 
you on?" 
And she said, "I don't recall." 
I then asked, "Did Tillman tell you to hit 
Mark?" 
Her response was, "He must have." 
I then told her I didn't want to know what 
must have happened, I wanted to know what 
did happen. Her response was, "I don't know 
why I am telling you this, it isn't true 
anyway. I didn't hit him." 
That was the substance of that conversation. 
CR. 1588-1589). 
Sgt. Thirsk also testified that there were some 
discrepancies in the statements made by Ms. Sagers at the first 
and second interviews. These included statements concerning Ms. 
Sagers's presence in the bedroom at the time of the killing, her 
possession of a weapon, and her knowledge of the location of the 
light switches in Schoenfeld's apartment CR. 1591-1592, 1596). 
On cross examination, Sgt. Thirsk stated that there was 
never any indication that defendant was not in the room at the 
time of the murder, nor was there any contradiction of the 
testimony that defendant was responsible for the killing CR. 
1600). In addition, Ms. Sagers admitted to feeling responsible 
for the crime because she did not attempt to stop defendant or to 
turn him in to the police (R. 1608). 
After Sgt. Thirsk's testimony, the jury was excused and 
defendant made a proffer through examination of witnesses to 
determine whether the polygraph test should be received for 
consideration by the jury. Each party was given the opportunity 
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present evidence concerning the reliability of polygraph 
,,, rng and the qualifications of Sgt. Thirsk as the examiner. 
,ed upon the evidence presented, Judge Baldwin denied the 
detense motion to admit the polygraph results on two grounds: 
IJJ reliability had not been sufficiently demonstrated, and (2) 
polygraphs interfere with the fact-finding process because jurors 
tend to give polygraph results excessive weight and credibility 
(R. 1738-1739). 
Defendant claims that this ruling was error, asserting 
that case law and the rules of evidence required admission of the 
results. This assertion is based upon a 
misinterpretation of both the rules of evidence and the relevant 
case law. The majority of courts, both at the state and federal 
levels, flatly reject the admission of polygraph evidence absent 
a stipulation of the parties. .se.e_, .e......g_._, United States y, 
Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975); State y. Ellison, 36 
Wash. App. 564, 570-571, 676 P.2d 531, 535 (1984); Commonwealth 
v. DiLego, 387 Mass. 394, 439 N.E.2d 807 (1982); People y, 
Colo., 637 P.2d 354 (1981); Hyder y. Superior Court, 
127 Ariz. 36, 617 P.2d 1152 (1980); 23 A.L.R.2d 1308. 
In Utah, admissibility of polygraph results absent a 
stipulation remains an open question. State y. Rebeter:ano, Utah, 
6bl P.2d 1265, 1268 (1984). Although State y. Abel, Utah, 600 
" 2r1 994 (1979), suggests that polygraph evidence may be 
admissible without a stipulation if a sufficient foundation were 
nothing in that case mandates admissibility. In light of 
the continuing controversy surrounding the reliability of 
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polygraph examinations, the trial court properly refused to admit 
the results of Ms. Sagers's polygraph examination. 
A polygraph is not a device which measures truth, but 
rather a machine that measures the emotional and physiological 
reactions of a given subject when he or she is asked specific 
questions. The theory behind the polygraph is that the telling 
of a lie triggers certain reactions in the autonomic nervous 
system which can be measured by machine. This theory ignores the 
reality, however, that a host of other emotions, including anger, 
fear, elation, and excitement trigger these same reactions. 
People v. Anderson, Colo., 637 P.2d at 356. The polygraph 
recognizes a lie only by these responses and its accuracy is 
limited by the dependability of the assumptions associated with 
these responses. The difficulty is that individual physiological 
reactions to polygraphs are not so universal as to permit 
reliable and standardized scientific measurement, despite the 
claims of proponents that the device is accurate up to 95% of the 
time • .l.d. at 359. Therefore, subjects who do not conform to 
the standard assumptions or fit the general pattern may be 
incorrectly branded. Katz, Dilemmas of Polygraph Stipulation, 14 
Seton Hall L. Rev. 285 (1984). 
Courts have recognized the advances made in polygraph 
procedure and its potential utility in certain restricted 
capacities, but they have stopped short of finding the results 
per se admissible for determining an individual's guilt or 
innocence. In United States y. Alexander, 526 F.2d at 166, the 
court expressed the prevailing view when it observed that there 
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j" yet insufficient assurance that the polygraph machines and 
!"'"'tors are sufficiently capable of discovering and controlling 
, f,r· subtle abnormalities or other factors which might influence 
the results. 2 A 1983 study by the Off ice of Technology 
Assessment, United States Congress, determined that there were 
still many unanswered questions concerning the theory and 
rPliability of polygraph testing. Katz, 
During cross examination, Sgt. Thirsk admitted that he 
could not unequivocally state that Ms. Sagers's test results were 
not a product of fear, guilt, intimidation or other emotions 
unrelated to the question of whether she way lying about certain 
facts (R. 1722). The admitted inability of the examiner to 
distinguish between those reactions engendered by lying and those 
produced by other intense emotions weighs heavily against the 
admissibility of the polygraph evidence, at least in this case. 
Also to be considered is the unique position occupied 
by the polygraph examiner. The recorded information produced by 
the polygraph is meaningless without interpretation by the 
examiner--interpretation which is subject to error. People v. 
Anderson, 637 P.2d at 360. Because of this unusual emphasis on 
the examiner, the polygraph theory and procedure present 
complexities not present in fingerprinting, ballistics, and blood 
'nalys1s, for example. l.Q. As noted in State y. Dean, 103 Wis • 
.:..>.[ 2Zl!L 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981): 
2 'l'h<e Eighth Circuit has twice reaffirmed its decision 
S..t.ates v. Alexander not to admit polygraph results, based in part 
>the continuing question of reliability . ..s..e.e. Conner v. Agur, 
,95 F.2d 407, 411 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gordon, 688 
1 .2d 42 (8th Cir. 1982). 
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Thus while the polygraph is enveloped in an 
aura of scientific precision and objective 
measurement of body responses, in large 
measure the result of the polygraph is 
dependent on the opinion of the examiner, 
and that opinion is drawn from a process 
which is almost completely in the control 
of the examiner. 
307 N.W.2d at 633. Polygraph evidence is also distinguishable 
from other types of scientific evidence in that the polygraph 
purports to go beyond mere identification to contend conclusively 
that a subject is or is not guilty. United States y. Alexander, 
526 F.2d at 169. 
Not only is the examiner almost exclusively in control 
of the procedures, there is evidence to suggest that the 
examiner's ultimate conclusion depends to a considerable extent 
on subjective perceptions and intuitions regarding the subject. 
Commonwealth y. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978). 
This subjective interpretation may lead to bias on the part of 
the examiner and errors reflecting the examiner's pre-conceived 
notions both in the questioning process and in the interpretation 
of results. Katz, p.16, at 294-295. 
Sgt. Thirsk admitted that prior to his second 
examination of Ms. Sagers (the exam which registered deceptive), 
he had developed a theory as to Ms. Sagers's involvement in the 
killing of Mark Schoenfeld. Simply stated, his theory was that 
defendant never would have allowed Ms. Sagers to be present at 
the killing without making her strike the victim so as to involve 
her further as an accomplice (R. 1716). There is no way to 
measure the effect of Sgt. Thirsk's pre-conceived theory on 
either the questions he posed to Ms. Sagers or his interpretation 
of the results. 
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Apart from consideration of reliability, courts have 
reluctant to admit polygraph results because they interfere 
with and may easily prejudice the jury's evaluation of witness 
demeanor and credibility. People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d at 358. 
Because polygraphs have an aura of scientific reliability, jurors 
are likely to give significant, if not conclusive, weight to the 
examiner's opinion. This results in jurors abdicating their role 
as the determiner of truth based on observations of witness 
demeanor • .l.d. at 361. The polygraph may also have the effect of 
lulling the jury into a false sense of security which may result 
in a failure to scrutinize conflicting testimony. Leonard v. 
Alaska App., 655 P.2d 766, 770 (1983). As noted in lln.i.t.e..d 
States y. Alexander: 
To the extent that polygraph results are 
accepted as unimpeachable or conclusive by 
jurors, ••• the jurors' traditional 
responsibility to collectively ascertain 
the facts and adjudge guilt or innocence 
is preempted. 
526 F.2d at 168. Often the testimony of the examiner becomes 
determinative of guilt or innocence. .l.d. When conflicting 
evidence is presented, the guilt issue may be determined based 
upon the credibility of the polygraph examiners' testimony and 
not upon that of the witnesses examined. People y. Anderson, 637 
P.2d at 361. 
Finally, in this case the defense sought to have the 
[Osults of a polygraph examination of a witness admitted, as 
opposed to polygraph evidence concerning the defendant. Most 
cases addressing the admissibility of polygraph evidence deal 
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with that issue as it relates to the defendant's tests. However, 
several courts have discussed the issue as it relates to a 
witness's tests. 
In Commonwealth y. DiLego, 439 N.E.2d at 809, the court 
specifically limited admissibility of polygraph evidence to 
corroboration or impeachment of the defendant's testimony. In 
concluding that admission of polygraph evidence on witnesses 
would improperly divert the jury's attention from the basic 
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence to an assessment 
of evidence indicating whether the various witnesses had passed 
or failed polygraph examinations, the court stated: 
In this country, the general rule, particu-
larly in the absence of any stipulation, is 
to exclude evidence of polygraph test results 
offered to corroborate or impeach a prosecu-
tion witness. 
439 N.E.2d at 808. 
Based upon the foregoing discussion and in light of the 
criteria set forth for admission of stipulated polygraph results 
in State y. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d at 1268, the trial court did not 
err in refusing to admit the polygraph evidence at the guilt 
phase of defendant's trial. 
B. PENALTY PHASE 
Defendant argues that based upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
207 ( 2) (Supp. 1983) and several United States Supreme Court 
decisions -- Lockett y. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 
438 u. s. 637 (1978); Green y. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); 
Eddings y. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) -- the trial court erred 
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1:1 refusing to admit at penalty phase the polygraph evidence it 
fuc;ed to admit at guilt phase. Although the authority cited by 
Jctendant clearly stands for the proposition that a capital 
defendant is not to be denied the opportunity to present all 
relevant evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase of his 
trial, it does not therefore permit the introduction of 
unreliable evidence. 
As noted above, the trial court in the instant case 
ruled that the proffered polygraph evidence was not reliable. 
Because a defendant is entitled to present only reliable evidence 
in mitigation of penalty, the trial court did not err in refusing 
to admit unreliable polygraph evidence. State y. Zuck, 134 Ariz. 
509, 514, 658 P.2d 162, 167 (1983); State y. Copeland, S.C., 300 
S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982), • .d.e.nlld, _U.S._, 103 s.ct. 1802 
(1983). State y. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 646, 683 
P.2d 1079, 1089 (1984) (polygraph examination results admissible 
by defense at sentencing phase of capital cases subject to 
certain restrictions -- e.g., reliability). The trial court is 
to determine what evidence is relevant to sentencing and, absent 
an abuse of discretion, its decisions in that regard should not 
be overturned • ..s..e_e United States y. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 611 
17th Cir. 1984) (considerable deference should be given to the 
Lrial court's decision to exclude polygraph evidence); 
Chlistopher y, State, Fla., 407 So. 2d 198 (1981), .c..e.tl· 
1'0 u. S. 910 ( 1982) (holding that the trial judge did not err in 
refusing to admit polygraph evidence in the penalty phase of a 
capital murder case). 
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Moreover, it is not clear that defendant sought to 
present the polygraph evidence at penalty phase for any purpose 
other than to attack again the credibility of the State's chief 
witness at guilt phase. It should not be the purpose of the 
penalty phase to relitigate the issue of guilt, to attack the 
credibility of guilt phase witnesses, or to impeach the verdict. 
Commonwealth v. Burden, 15 Mass. App. 666, 448 N.E.2d 387, 396 
( 1983) • 
POINT III 
BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO CERTAIN ALLEGEDLY 
IMPROPER REMARKS MADE BY THE PROSECUTOR, 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR 
APPEAL; ALTERNATIVELY, THE PROSECUTOR'S 
REMARKS DO NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL. 
Defendant contends that both his conviction and death 
sentence should be reversed due to allegedly improper comments 
made by the prosecutor at the guilt and penalty phases of his 
trial. The comments made at each phase of the trial, which 
defendant argues are grounds for reversal, will be dealt with 
separately. 
A. GUILT PHASE 
Defendant refers to four statements made by the 
prosecutor during the guilt phase of his trial which he claims 
constituted improper comment (see Appellant's Brief at pp. 21, 
31). However, defendant did not lodge a contemporaneous 
objection to any of the allegedly offending comments CR. 1764-
1765, 1769-1770, 1838, 1847). 
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When improper argument occurs at trial, "[tlhe proper 
,,, :;e is to object to the improper argument and request a 
larifying instruction if necessary." State v. Smith, Utah, 675 
r. 2d 521, 526-527 ( 1983). This Court has established a strict 
waiver rule for those situations where an objection is not made 
to the allegedly improper argument, even when the defendant's 
constitutionally protected right not to testify is involved. In 
State v. Hales, Utah, 652 P.2d 1290 (1982), where that right was 
involved, the Court held: 
The prosecutor's statements in the instant 
case come perilously close to, if they do not 
exceed, the limits of permissible comment 
under this standard. However, we are pre-
cluded from reaching the issue of their con-
stitutionality by defendant's failure to 
object to them at trial. 
652 P.2d at 1292. This rule is equally applicable in capital 
cases. .e......g.._, Burris y. State, Ind., 465 N. E. 2d 171, 187 
(1984): Mincey y, State, 251 Ga. 255, 267, 304 S.E.2d 882, 892 
11983): People y, Murtishaw, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 751, 631 P.2d 
446, 459 (198ll, 102 s.ct. 1280 Cl982l: 
Palmes y. Wainwrj9ht, 725 F.2d 1511, 1525 (11th Cir. 1984) (in 
habeas corpus context) • 
Because defendant failed to object at trial to the 
prosecutor's comments he now challenges on appeal, this Court is 
precluded from addressing the issue. Defendant's motion for a 
,·,1strial based upon alleged references by the prosecutor to 
,Jefendant's failure to testify, which was made after the jury had 
retired for deliberations CR. 1979), was also insufficient to 
Pteserve the issue for review. 652 P.2d at 1292. 
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Even if the Court decides to address this issue, the 
prosecutor's comments do not warrant reversal. First, with 
respect to the alleged remarks on defendant's failure to testify, 
the State agrees that prosecutorial comment thereon (i.e., 
comment on a defendant's exercise of his constitutional right to 
remain silent) may violate a defendant's right against self-
incrimination. State y. r.airby, Utah, _P.2d_, No. 18998, slip 
op. at 22 (December 31, 1984). However, when there have not been 
repeated efforts to comment on the defendant's silence and the 
jury has been instructed in such a way as to cure any prejudice, 
reversible error may not result. Lairby, slip op. at 24; .s..t.a..t..e 
y. Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292; State y. Wiswell, Utah, 639 P.2d 146, 
147-148 (1981). 
Although it is far from clear that the remarks to which 
defendant refers could be construed as comment on defendant's 
failure to testify, even if it is assumed that they were, the 
remarks were not extensive and the court specifically instructed 
the jury "that no presumption adverse to [defendant] is to arise 
from the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the 
witness stand." Instruction No. 13 (R. 192) (contained in 
Appendix A). Under these circumstances, reversal is not 
warranted • ..5..e.e. Lairby, slip op. at 24. 
Furthermore, when the prosecutor's remarks are 
considered in context, it becomes apparent that there is little 
chance that the jurors could have interpreted them as comment on 
defendant's failure to testify, or that they were impermissibly 
influenced by those remarks. State y. Creviston, Utah, 646 
P.2d 750, 754 Cl982l. 
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Defense counsel went to great lengths at trial to 
Ms. Sagers, the State's key witness. The suggestion 
was that she was more directly involved in the crime than she 
claimed and that she sought to cast blame on defendant (R. 995-
1153, 1168-1172). The prosecutor, apparently in an attempt to 
bolster Ms. Sagers's credibility, said the following in his 
closing argument (as placed in context): 
You can rest assured of one thing, Carla 
Sagers didn't have the guts to get out of it 
if Lori Groneman didn't. And Lori Groneman 
said on cross-examination to Barber, "I was 
scared to death of Elroy Tillman," and she's 
assertive. What do you think Carla Sagers was 
doing, or how she was feeling? And even after 
she's caught, even after extensive interroga-
tion by myself, Officer Chapman, and others, 
she still doesn't say anything derogatory about 
Elroy to try to cast blame on him or call him 
names or anything else. Even though you may 
say to yourselves. "Carla Sagers isn't any 
better than Elroy Tillman." she did have a 
heart and she did tell the truth and she didn't 
demand immunity. she didn't demand an attorney 
or all the other things indicative of guilt. 
She told Chapman what had happened. Even tried 
to protect him. She told Steve Chapman what 
had happened. 
iR. 1764-1765) (the portion of that statement which defendant 
challenges is underlined). The statement does not expressly 
comment on defendant's silence, nor can the statement, taken as a 
whole, reasonably be interpreted as such. Although the 
prosecutor's remark that Ms. Sagers "didn't demand immunity, 
.. didn't demand an attorney or all the other things 
indicative of guilt" is highly questionable, the prosecutor did 
not attempt to tie those factors to defendant, or to defendant's 
failure to testify. 
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The second remark by the prosecutor that defendant 
challenges as a comment on defendant's silence is the following 
(as placed in context): 
You have had a chance to look at Elroi 
Tillman during these proceedings. Detecting 
remorse? Detecting anithing? You get a feel 
for people by what is said, what they do, how 
they react, and I hope you were paying atten-
tion to that as well. You can never make 
sense, ladies and gentlemen, out of this type 
of a crime unless you take it a step at a time. 
One little bit of involvement leads to another, 
leads to another. And in so doing human 
history is met. 
CR, 1769-1770) (the challenged portion of the statement is 
underlined), Again, the remark does not expressly comment on 
defendant's failure to testify, nor can it reasonably be 
interpreted as such. It appears the prosecutor was simply 
reminding the jury to assess defendant's actions and demeanor in 
the courtroom, factors the jury was asked to pay particular 
attention to by the prosecutor in his opening statement at the 
beginning of trial CR. 488) , 
Defendant's argument that two other remarks by the 
prosecutor during his summation amounted to impermissible 
interjections of the prosecutor's personal opinion, is without 
merit. The first allegedly offending comment by the prosecutor 
is the following: 
And I consider it significant that the 
police from Bountiful who testified on the 
stand were getting between ten and fifteen 
reports of incidences daily from the Gronemans 
during 1982 , ..• 
CR. 1838), Although the assertion that "ten and fifteen reports 
of incidences daily from the Gronemans during 1982" may have been 
-30-
" f'xaggeration, 3 the fact it relates was not of such critical 
1rnpo1tance to the case that reversal of defendant's conviction is 
required. Moreover, the prosecutor's statement that "I consider 
it significant" does not amount to impermissible interjection of 
personal opinion; it easily falls within the considerable freedom 
traditionally accorded the prosecutor, as well as defense 
counsel, in expressing to the jury his view of the evidence. 
State y, Williams, Utah, 656 P.2d 450, 454 (1982); State y. 
l:Ltll..s, Utah, 603 P.2d 810, 813 (1979), 
The second comment defendant challenges is the 
following (as placed in context): 
I am not trying to tell you that I think 
Carla Sagers is a wonderful person. I think 
she's confused but she's not a killer and 
there has been nothing to refute what she 
said went on inside that house on May 25 and 
May 26. There has been nothing to rebut 
that. I kind of would like to wonder what 
would for instance. if the Mormon 
Tabernacle Choir observed the whole killing. 
how wot1ld Mr. Barber attempt to discredit 
them? Think about that one. There's no 
better evidence, ladies and gentlemen, than 
eyewitness testimony, and we can't read 
people's minds. We don't know what they did 
or what they said or what they thought. The 
State isn't required by proof beyond a 
reasonble doubt to prove to you 100 per cent 
of what went on. All we can do is submit to 
you facts and let you draw conclusions from 
those facts, and I would certainly like to 
have a mind reader or the ability to mind 
A prosecutor may not assert arguments he knows to be 
''iaccurate. State v. Williams, Utah, 656 P.2d 450, 454 (1982), 
Qting Walker v. State, Utah, 624 P.2d 687 (1981). Although the 
prosecutor's statement here was not totally accurate with respect 
to the numbers used, the gist of the statement (i.e., that there 
had been frequent complaints from the Gronemans concerning 
harrassment) was true and supported by the record (R, 671, 672, 
683, 687-688, 778, 843, 1183). 
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read what goes on. But there is nothing 
whatsoever to refute the testimony of Carla 
Sagers and what occurred inside that house. 
And we know she was there because her 
identification and description of the crime 
fits. She wasn't taken back to the scene of 
the crime by Officer Chapman. She told what 
had happened and what had occurred •••• 
(R. 1847) (the challenged portion of the statement is 
underlined). The prosecutor obviously made these comments in 
rebuttal to defense counsel's attack on the credibility of Ms. 
Sagers in his closing argument CR. 1774-1833). Although the 
prosecutor's hypothetical involving the Mormon Tabernacle Choir 
may not have been the most appropriate hypothetical he might 
have used, his argument did not exceed the boundaries of 
permissible responsive argument. State v. Williams, 656 
P.2d at 454; United States y. Covelli, 738 F.2d 847, 857 (7th 
Cir. 1984), .c..e..t..t • .de.ni..e..Q, 105 s.ct. 211 Cl984l. 
Furthermore, defendant's suggestion that the comment was 
intended to appeal to the religious feelings of the jury cannot 
be considered seriously, given the context in which reference to 
the Mormon Tabernacle Choir, the only reference to something 
"religious," was made. 
B. PENALTY PHASE 
Defendant refers to three statements made by the 
prosecutor at penalty phase as grounds for reversal of his death 
sentence (see Appellant's Brief at pp. 22, 32). Again, 
defendant did not object to those statements during penalty 
phase or request any curative or cautionary instructions. Based 
upon the authority cited above, this Court is therefore 
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1 recluded from addressing the issue. State y. Hales; .s..e_e .al...s_Q 
.iobett v. State, Fla., 449 So.2d 803, 808 (1984). 
Moreover, although the prosecutor's statements are 
troublesome, it does not appear that his remarks rendered the 
penalty hearing fundamentally unfair . ..s..e.e_ Willie y. Maggio, 737 
F.2d 1372, 1390-1391 (5th Cir. 1984); Felder y. Estelle, 588 F. 
supp. 664 (S.D. Tex. 1984); .ct.. State y. Creviston, 646 P.2d at 
754. 
POINT IV 
ALTHOUGH IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED FROM THE GENERAL 
VERDICT WHETHER THE JURY UNANIMOUSLY FOUND 
AT LEAST ONE OF THE UNDERLYING FELONIES 
CHARGED FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER IN THIS CASE, 
THAT IS NOT GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL. 
Although Point VI of defendant's brief (see 
Appellant's Brief at pp. 65-69) is somewhat confusing, it 
appears that defendant is arguing that because this Court cannot 
know whether the jury unanimously found at least one of the 
underlying felonies charged for first degree murder in the 
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information, his conviction must be reversed. 4 The information 
charged defendant with intentionally or knowingly causing the 
death of Mark Allen Schoenfeld, while "engaged in the commissio11 
of, or attempting to commit, lblurglary or [alggravated 
[blurglary; arson or aggravated arson" (R. 17> <see 
"Information," attached as Appendix E). The jury was instructed 
that an essential element of the charge was "[tlhat at the time 
the homicide was committed, the defendant was engaged in the 
commission of, or attempting to commit burglary or aggravated 
burglary, and/or arson or aggravated arson" (R. 194) <see 
Instruction No. 15, contained in Appendix A). 
This argument raises several issues: (lJ whether 
under Utah's first degree murder statute the jury must be 
unanimous as to at least one of several underlying felonies 
charged pursuant to that statute; and (2) if unanimity is 
required, whether under the circumstances of this case the 
existence of only a general verdict, from which it cannot be 
determined that the jury was unanimous as to at least one of the 
4 Although defendant refers to the charge against him as "felony 
murder," that characterization is not particularly accurate in 
the context of Utah's first degree murder statute, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-5-202 (1978) (amended 1983). Traditionally, felony murder 
refers to a killing committed in the course of a felony, whether 
or not the killing is intentional. PERKINS AND BOYCE, CRIMINAL 
LAW (3d ed. 1982). In short, "[tl he purpose of the felony murder 
rule is to relieve the state of the burden of proving 
premeditation and malice when the victim's death is caused by the 
killer while he is committing another felony." State v. Wilson, 
220 Kan. 341, 552 P.2d 931, 935 (1976). 
A felony murder provision is contained in Utah's second degree 
murder statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 ( ll Cd) <Supp. 1983). 
However, the first degree murder statute only uses the felony as 
an underlying "aggravating" circumstance for an intentional or 
knowing killing. § 76-5-202(1) (d). 
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1lying felonies, requires reversal of defendant's 
1ction. 
Defendant was charged under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 
11978), prior to the amendment of that statute in 1983. The 
"aggravating" circumstance charged by the State in order to make 
this particular criminal homicide first degree murder was 
contained in § 76-5-202(1) (dl ,5 the subsection enumerating 
various felonies. The first question to be addressed is whether 
the jury must be unanimous as to at least one of several 
underlying felonies charged pursuant to § 76-5-202(1) (d) before 
a defendant may be convicted of first degree murder. 6 
Although not identical, an issue very similar to this 
has been addressed by a number of courts. One question 
presented in State y. Encinas, 132 Ariz. 493, 496-497, 647 P.2d 
624, 627 (1982), State y. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 
931, 935-936 (1976), and People y. Milan, 107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73-
74, 507 P.2d 956, 961-962 (1973), for example, was whether the 
5 Section 76-5-202 (1) (dl provided: 
11) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if 
the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another 
under any of the following circumstances: 
ldl The homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in 
the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
rommitting or attempting to commit, aggravated robbery, robbery, 
forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated 
arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated 
'1clnap[Jing or kidnapping. 
" The State does not intend to address the question of whether 
the jury must be unanimous as to an underlying aggravating 
circumstance when various circumstances other than those 
contained in subsection ( ll (d) are charged. That question is not 
Ptt'sented in this appeal. 
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jury must be unanimous on at least one of two alternative 
theories of first degree murder presented to it - i.e., 
premeditated murder or felony murder. Each of those cases held 
that unanimity was not required; the jurors theoretically could 
split on which of the two theories applied to the defendant and 
still validly return a "unanimous" verdict of guilty of first 
degree murder. 
Taking the Arizona first degree murder statute, ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 13-1105 (Supp. 1984), and the relevant case law in 
that state as an example,7 jurors could disagree amongst 
themselves on the alternative theories of premeditated murder 
and felony murder, but still return a unanimous verdict of 
guilty of first degree murder, and subject the defendant to the 
possibility of the death penalty. Logically, under this 
analysis, if the jury in a first degree murder case were 
presented with alternative theories of felony murder (e.g., 
causing the death of any person in the course of burglary or 
arson), the jurors need not be unanimous on the particular 
theory of felony murder, so long as they are unanimous on the 
defendant's guilt of the crime of first degree murder. 
Applying this reasoning to Utah's first degree murder 
statute and the case at bar, this Court could hold that jury 
7 The California situation is somewhat different and will be 
discussed below. Kansas does not have the death penalty for 
first degree murder. 
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,,,a11imity as to arson or burglary8 in defendant's case was not 
111ired. The jury need only unanimously agree that defendant 
,JL guilty of first degree murder. The verdict could stand as 
Jung as there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
either of the felony alternatives. And, because, as is evident 
from this brief's statement of facts, there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of either burglary or arson,9 the 
Court could properly affirm defendant's conviction based on a 
general verdict. This is precisely the analysis the Montana 
Supreme Court applied in a capital case before it - Fitzpatrick 
v. State, Mont., 638 P.2d 1002, 1011-1012 (1981), distinguishing 
State v. Green, 94 Wash. 2d 216, 616 P. 2d 628 (1980). .l:.f., 
State y, Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972) 
(affirming conviction where jury was instructed on alternative 
theories of first degree murder and the evidence justified the 
verdict under either theory). 
8 It appears necessary only to discuss arson and burglary, rather 
than their "aggravated" counterparts, since those jurors finding 
aggravated arson or aggravated burglary necessarily also found 
arson and burglary. 
9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202(1) (1978) provides: 
(1) a person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
llTAfl CODE ANN. § 76-6-102(1) (b) <1978) provides: 
Ill A person is guilty of arson if, under circumstances not 
3mounting to aggravated arson, by means of fire or explosives, he 
unlawfully and intentionally damages: 
(bl The property of another. 
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Defendant relies heavily on State y, Green, 94 Wash. 
2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980), to support his argument that the 
jury must be unanimous on at least one of several underlying 
felonies charged pursuant to § 76-5-202C1 l (d). In the 
Washington Supreme Court reversed a first degree murder 
conviction where the defendant had been charged with felony 
murder based upon two alternative underlying felonies - rape .Q_(_ 
kidnapping. Concluding that the jury must unanimously find one 
or both of the underlying felonies before it could convict the 
defendant of first degree murder based upon felony murder, the 
court held that the conviction could not stand because there was 
insufficient evidence to support a kidnapping and it could not 
be determined from the general verdict whether the jury 
unanimously agreed that the killing occurred in the course of or 
in furtherance 616 P.2d at 637-638. 10 
In so far held that "fwlhere ..• the 
commission of a specific underlying crime is necessary to 
sustain a conviction for a more serious statutory criminal 
offense [i.e., first degree murder predicated upon felony 
murder), jury unanimity as to the underlying crime is 
imperative," 616 P.2d at 638, it is supportive of defendant's 
position and contrary to that discussed above . .iS..e.e .aJ....s..o 
v. Olsson, 56 Mich. App. 500, 224 N.W.2d 691 (1974). However, 
decided in the context of insufficient evidence to 
support one of the underlying felonies and an inability to 
lO .G..I..e..e..n interpreted a first degree murder statute which 
contained a felony murder provision. 616 P.2d at 631. 
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1, om the general verdict whether any of the jurors based their 
,,,,Ji111J of guilt upon the felony that was not supported by the 
,11dence. _l_d. It is not clear that the court would have 
1eversed the conviction had there been sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of that felony • ..s..e.e_ State y, Franco, 96 Wash. 
2d 816, 823-824, 619 P. 2d 1320, 1323-1324 ( 1982). 
Although G.L..e..en lends support to defendant's position, 
the case dealt with a statute that includes felony murder, as it 
is traditionally defined (see fn. 3, as an alternative 
means of committing first degree murder -- i.e, an alternative 
to premeditated murder. This was also the case in Encinas, 
lii.l..filill, and 1:1.iL;u). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (Supp. 
1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1981); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 189 
!West 1970) (present version in Supp. 1985). Utah's first 
degree murder statute is designed somewhat differently than the 
statutes at issue in those cases. Section 76-5-202 does not 
include traditional felony murder as an alternative means of 
committing first degree murder. Rather, the statute requires 
that "the actor intentionally or knowingly cause[] the death of 
another under any of [several "aggravating"] circumstances." § 
76-5-202(1). Thus, an unintentional killing committed in the 
course of a felony is not first degree murder; it is second 
degree murder . ..s..e.e_ § 76-5-202(1) (d); § 76-5-203(1) (d). 
Utah's first degree murder statute is, however, quite 
cunrlar to California's overall capital murder scheme. Under 
Culrfornia law, the jury must first find the defendant guilty of 
first degree murder, which is essentially defined as a 
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premeditated killing or a killing committed in the perpetration 
of, or attempted perpetration of, certain felonies (felony 
murder). CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190 .1 (a) (West Supp. 1985). 
If both of those alternatives are charged, the .Ml.Lill rule 
concerning unanimity would apply. In addition to determining 
the first degree murder question at the guilt phase, the jury 
also determines whether any of the charged "special 
circumstances" exist, one of which must be found beyond a 
reasonable doubt before the defendant may be subjected to the 
possibility of a death sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 190.l(a), 
190 .2, 190 .4 (al (West Supp. 1985). This procedure is analagous 
to the "aggravating" circumstance the jury is required to find 
in Utah before the defendant is subjected to the possibility of 
a death sentence. § 76-5-202(1) (al-Chl .11 
Finally, under California law the special 
circumstances must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a 
unanimous verdict. As noted in People y. Garcia, 205 Cal. Rptr. 
265, 684 P.2d 826 (1984): 
We have • • • noted the resemblance between a 
special circumstance proceeding and a trial 
to determine guilt. In People v. Superior 
Court <Engert) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797, 803, 183 
Cal.Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76, we said: "In the 
California scheme the special circumstance is 
not just an aggravating factor: it is a fact 
or set of facts, found beyond reasonable 
doubt by a unanimous verdict (Pen. Code, § 
190.4), which changes the crime from one 
punishable by imprisonment of 25 years to 
life to one which must be punished either by 
11 The 1983 amendment enlarged the number of aggravating 
circumstances. They are now contained in § 76-5-202 ( 1) (a) -(q) 
(Supp. 1983). 
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death or life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole. The fact or set of 
facts to be found in regard to the special 
circumstance is not less crucial to the 
potential for deprivation of liberty on the 
part of the accused than are the elements of 
the underlying crime which, when found by a 
jury, define the crime rather than a lesser 
included offense or component." {Fn. 
omitted. l 
684 P.2d at 832. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.4{a) specifically 
states: 
Whenever a special circumstance requires 
proof of the commission or attempted 
commission of a crime, such crime shall be 
charged and proved pursuant to the general 
law applying to the trial and conviction of 
the crime. 
In California the jury must be unanimous in a criminal case. 
CONST. art I, § 16; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1163 {West 1970). 
Tuus, the California scheme probably provides the most 
compelling support for defendant's position that the jury must 
be unanimous as to at least one of several underlying felony 
circumstances charged pursuant to § 76-5-202 { 1) {dl. .c.t.. 
States y. Gi1?son, 553 F.2d 453 <Sth Cir. 1977) {holding that 
when "conceptually distinct" alternatives for commission of a 
crime are charged, the jury must be unanimous on at least one of 
the alternatives before a valid guilty verdict can be returned). 
Stt Casenote, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 499 (1977). 
In sum, there are two well defined and well supported 
on the issue presented to this Court. Although the 
Court could adopt either position in this case, it would appear 
that the California scheme with its special circumstance 
requirement, and which best illustrates the position that a jury 
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must be unanimous on an underlying felony for first degree 
murder punishable by death, is probably most like Utah's capital 
murder statutory scheme. A compelling argument can be made that 
charging a felony circumstance under § 76-5-202 ( ll (d) is 
tantamount to charging the commission of the felony separately, 
and thus the state should have to operate under the same burden 
as it would in a regular trial on the felony i.e., proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity on the defendant's 
guilt of the felony. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 76-1-501 (1978), 77-35-21 (b) (1982). If this Court were 
to adopt the position that the jury must be unanimous as to at 
least one of several underlying felonies charged in a first 
degree murder case, the question then would be whether in the 
instant case the existence of only a general verdict, from which 
it cannot be determined whether the jury was unanimous on either 
arson or burglary (or both), requires reversal of defendant's 
conviction. 
Assuming the Court were to adopt the unanimity 
requirement discussed above, under the circumstances of this 
case reversal is not warranted. At trial, defendant did not 
take exception to the jury instruction concerning first degree 
murder on the grounds that it did not contain a unanimity 
requirement for the underlying felonies (R. 1852), nor did he 
request an instruction in that regard (see Defendant's Requested 
Instructions, R. 140-157), nor did he request special verdict 
forms pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-21 (d) (1982). Under 
these circumstances, he is not in a position to complain on 
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,'l"'::il about the general verdict or the lack of an instruction 
that the jury must be unanimous on at least one of 
rhe underlying felonies charged. State y, Fisher, Utah, 680 
P.2d 35, 37 (1984); State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d at 278, 495 
P.2d at 805. 
Moreover, it has been widely held that a general 
instruction on the requirement of unanimity is sufficient to 
instruct the jurors that they must be unanimous on whatever 
they find to be the predicate of a guilty 
verdict, particularly in the absence of a request for more 
unanimity instructions. United States y, 
Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 611 (7th Cir. 1984); United States y. 
618 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1980); Ciccagliano y. State, 
Del. Supr., 474 A.2d 126, 130 (1984). Although in hindsight it 
may have been preferable to give a more specific unanimity 
instruction, failure to do so does not constitute plain error. 
United States y, Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1345 (5th Cir. 1983), 
_u.s._, 104 s.ct. 996 (1984). And, a court 
should not speculate about whether the jury reached a non-
unanimous verdict when there is no indication that it did. 
State y, Dobbs, 100 N. M. 60, 70-71, 665 P. 2d 1151, 1162 ( 1983). 
l:f, United States y, Powell, _U.S._, 53 U.S.L.W. 4012 
1December 10, 1984) <holding that there was no reason to vacate 
defendant's conviction merely because the jury's verdicts 
'could not rationally be reconciled). 
Finally, a decision not to reverse under these 
CJrcurnstances would be consistent with recent decisions from 
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this Court and the United States Supreme Court holding that 
there was harmless error in a capital case. s.e_e Zant y. 
Stephens, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983); Barela¥ y. Florida, 
103 S.Ct. 3418 (1983); Andrews y. Morris, Utah, 677 
P.2d 81, 95-96 (1983) (harmless error not to have given beyond a 
reasonable doubt instruction at penalty phase). Even if the 
Court adopts the unanimity requirement, because, as noted above, 
there was sufficient evidence to support either of the 
underlying felony circumstances charged in defendant's case, 
defendant's conviction may properly be upheld. S.e..e State y. 
Fisher, Utah, 680 P.2d at 38; State y, Anderson, 27 Utah 2d at 
278, 495 P.2d at 805. 12 
POINT V 
THE MERGER DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO FELONY 
MURDER DOES NOT PROHIBIT A CONVICTION 
OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER WHEN THE UNDERLYING 
FELONY CIRCUMSTANCE IS INCIDENTAL TO THE 
MURDER; AND, THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT 
DEFENDANT COMMITTED MURDER WHILE ENGAGED IN 
THE COMMISSION OF A BURGLARY. 
In Point VII of his brief (Appellant's Brief at pp. 
69-78), defendant argues that the underlying felonies charged in 
his case for first degree murder -- burglary and arson --
"merged" into the homicide and therefore could not be used as 
12 It is not clear from either or Anderson whether this 
Court believed the jury must be unanimous on one of the 
variations of second or first degree murder presented in those 
cases. That issue apparently has never been decided in this 
state, but may be decided, at least in the context of Utah's 
second degree murder statute, in State v. Russell, Case No. 
18951, now pending in this Court. 
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·., i•1t2lVating" circumstances to elevate the murder from second 
to first degree. He further challenges the burglary 
ci1cumstance on the ground that the murder was not committed 
"while the actor was engaged in the commission of" burglary. 
§ 76-5-202(1) (d). 
A. 
Defendant adequately preserved the "merger" issue at 
trial by filing a pretrial motion to quash or reduce the charge 
in the information (R. 68-91), requesting instructions in that 
regard (R. 156-157), and filing a motion for a new trial based 
upon the error respecting merger that he now asserts on appeal 
(R. 357). To support his merger arguments, defendant relies 
almost exclusively on cases dealing with felony murder. As 
discussed in the preceding point, the use of felonies as an 
aggravating circumstance under § 76-5-202(1) (d) does not involve 
the felony murder rule, as that concept is traditionally 
defined. Therefore, the analysis provided by the cases cited by 
defendant and others that reach the opposite conclusion, 
in many ways relevant to the issue presented here, is 
not dispositive of the question. 
As noted in People y. Wilson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 494, 462 
P.2d 22 (1969), a case cited by defendant: 
'The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to 
deter felons from killing negligently or 
accidentally by holding them strictly 
responsible for killings they commit.' 
462 P.2d at 28 (citation omitted). .ill..fil! State y. Lashley, 
233 Kan. 620, 631, 664 P.2d 1358, 1369 (1983), The concern in 
the cases cited by defendant is that a broadening of the felony 
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murder rule to include those situations where the underlying 
felony is an integral part of the homicide would not further 
the deterrent purpose of the rule, Peoi;ile v. Wilfilill, 462 P.2d at 
28, and would relieve the state of its traditional burden of 
proving intent or malice aforethought in a murder case. 
v. Henderson, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4, 560 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1977). 
Those concerns are not present here. The underlying felony 
circumstances contained in § 76-5-202 ( 1) (dl are essentially 
enhancement factors that render an intentional or knowing 
killing a more serious offense. They serve a distinctly 
different purpose than does the underlying felony in the 
operation of the felony murder rule. 
Moreover, the merger doctrine, as applied in the cases 
cited by defendant, is by no means universally accepted. 
v. United States, D.C., 373 A.2d 885, 888-889 (1977), for 
example, flatly rejected the holding of Peoi;ile v. Wilson. 
.a.l..Q.Q State v. Mercer, 34 Wash. App. 654, 661-662, 663 P.2d 857, 
861 (1983); State v. Reams, 292 Or. 1, 636 P.2d 913 <1981) 
(distinguishing State y. Branch, 244 Or. 97, 415 P.2d 766 
(1966)); State y. Rui;ie, 226 Kan. 474, 479, 601 P.2d 675, 678-679 
(1979) •13 
13 The Utah Supreme Court apparently has never addressed issues 
relating to the merger doctrine, and there appears to be no 
reason to address them here, in that this case does not 
specifically involve traditional felony murder. U· State v. 
Baker, Utah, 671 P.2d 152, 158-159 (1983) (dictum) (evidence 
proving theft in a trial involving only a charge of first degree 
homicide would not make theft a lesser included offense). 
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The only cases cited by defendant that specifically 
i1,ss the issue concerning the underlying felony circumstances 
,'11tained in§ 76-5-202(1) (d) are People v. Green, 164 Cal. 
1<i•lt. 1, 609 P.2d 468 (1980), and People y. Thompson, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. 898, 611 P.2d 883 (1980). Those cases clearly stand for 
the proposition that a felony charged as a special cirucmstance 
in a capital murder case, proof of which makes the defendant 
eligible for the death penalty, must be independent of the 
murder; the underlying felony may not be merely incidental to 
the murder. As noted in Thompson: 
A murder is not committed .dJll.ing a robbery 
within the meaning of the statute unless 
the accused has "killed in cold blood in 
order to advance an independent felonious 
purpose, e.g., [has] carried out an 
execution-style slaying of the victim 
of or witness to a holdup, a kidnaping, or 
a rape." (l_d., at p.61, 164 Cal.Rptr. at 
p. 38, 609 P. 2d at p. 505, emphasis added.) 
A special circumstance allegation of murder 
committed during a robbery has not been 
established where the accused's primary 
criminal goal "is not to steal but to kill 
and the robbery is merely incidental to the 
murder .•. because its sole object is 
to facilitate or conceal the primary crime." 
(l.d., at p. 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. at p. 38, 
609 P.2d at p. 505.) 
611 P.2d at 893, .c.i.t.i.ng People y. Green (emphasis in original). 
Although the State has previously acknowledged the 
similarity between California's special circumstance requirment 
and Utah's "aggravating" circumstance requirement (see pp. 39-40 
the position expressed in G.L.e..e.n and Thompson is neither 
om trolling nor one that should be adopted in Utah. The 
ralifornia Supreme Court's narrow reading of that state's 
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special circumstance statute14 is not necessarily arpl icable to 
Utah's first degree murder statute. The California court 
concerned that: 
[t]o permit a jury to choose who will live 
and who will die on the basis of whether in 
the course of committing a first degree 
murder the defendant happens to engage in 
ancillary conduct that technically 
constitutes robbery or one of the other 
listed felonies would be to revive 'the risk 
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action' 
condemned by the high court plurality in 
(428 U. s. at p. 189, 96 s. Ct. at p. 
2832.) 
609 P.2d at 505-506. However, this concern based on 
is unwarranted. 
Under California law, the jury does not determine the 
death penalty question when it finds the "truth" of a special 
circumstance; it merely determines whether the defendant is 
eligible for the death penalty. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1. The 
court appears to recognize this at one point, but then 
strays from that fact when it quotes the "arbitrary and 
14 CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.2 (Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent 
part: 
Cal The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the 
first degree shall be death or confinement in state prison for a 
term of life without the possibility of parole in any case in 
which one or more of the following special circumstances has been 
charged and specially found under Section 190.4, to be true: 
Cl7l The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged 
in or was an accomplice in the commission of, attempted 
commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or 
attempting to commit the following felonies: 
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'i't i,'ious" lirnguuge contained in Greg'>] v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
'" ,;1. 609 P.2d at 505. That language refers 
ll1e sentencing function of the jury. 
,\atutes that "have standards so vague that they fail adequately 
to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the 
1esult that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing 
like that found unconstitutional in £lll1D.a.n could occur." 
428 U.S. at 195 n. 46; State y. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (1982), 
i;_e_r_t • de.llll..d , 4 5 9 u . s • 9 8 8 • 
The basic flaw in .G.r..e_en is that it rejects, on the 
basis of G.L..e_gg, the notion that the legislature could have 
validly intended to include within the definition of the felony 
special circumstance those situations where the felonies were 
committed during the commission of and in furtherance of the 
murder. It is not at all clear that the legislature must have 
intended to restrict the felony special circumstance to those 
situations where the murder was committed during the commission 
of and in furtherance of an independent felony. Certainly, such 
an interpretation is not required by 
State legislatures are accorded wide latitude in 
Jefining criminal conduct for their citizens. Hughes y. 
576 F. 2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 197 8) , • .d.eni.e..d 439 
U.S. 801. They enjoy similar freedom in determining what 
er imrnal conduct war rants the death penalty, 428 U.S. 
•' 175 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.), 
'.utJ1ect, of course, to certain constitutional limitations. 
<,;.,_s_., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that 
-49-
Georgia's death penalty for rape of an adult woman violated the 
Eighth Amendment); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976) (holding that statutes requiring mandatory death sentences 
are unconstitutional). There appears to be no constitutional 
prohibition against a legislature defining capital murder to 
include the situation where murder is committed during the 
commission of certain felonies and the felonies are merely 
incidental to the murder -- i.e., they are not clearly 
independent from the defendant's primary purpose, which is to 
commit murder. Such a definition would not describe all murders 
and thus provide no rational distinction between those murders 
for which the death penalty is appropriate and those for which 
it is not • .S,e.e. Godfrey y. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980l; S.ta..t..e 
y. Wood, 648 P.2d at 77. 
A legislature could reasonably determine that murder, 
committed in the course of other felonious conduct, is a 
sufficiently egregious form of murder to warrant the death 
penalty, even though the underlying felonious conduct may be 
closely related to the defendant's primary purpose of committing 
murder. 373 A.2d at 888-889 (discussing the 
applicability of the merger doctrine in the context of felony 
murder where the underlying felony was burglary predicated upon 
an intent to assault the victim). Two cases decided by the 
Arizona Supreme Court are particularly applicable to this issue. 
In State v. Spoon, 137 Ariz. 105, 669 P.2d 83 (1983), the court 
reaffirmed its position that burglary predicated on intent to 
commit aggravated assault may serve as a basis for a felony 
-50-
,,,,der conviction under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-1105(A) (2) 
'i'l'· 1984) which provides: 
A. A person commits first degree murder if: 
2. Acting [either] alone or with one or more 
other persons such person commits or attempts 
to commit ••• burglary under § 13-1506, 13-
1507 or 13-1508 ..• and in the course of 
and in furtherance of such offense or 
immediate flight from such offense, such 
person or another person causes the death of 
any person. 
669 P.2d at 85. .a.l.s..Q State y. Hankins, 141 Ariz. 217, 686 
P.2d 740, 744 <1984). In State v. Miniefield, llO Ariz. 599, 
602, 522 P.2d 25, 28 (1974), the court held that arson, although 
an ingredient of the homicide itself, could provide the basis 
for a felony murder conviction under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
452 (1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 138, § ll, which provided: "A 
murder which is committed in the perpetration of, •• 
arson is murder of the first degree." 522 P.2d at 27-
28 .1 s _s.e.e .al..sQ Strong y. State, 251 Ga. 540, 307 S.E.2d 912 
11983) (aggravated assault or assault with a deadly weapon upon 
the homicide victim can support a finding of felony murder); 
!laker v. State, 236 Ga. 754, 757, 255 S. E.2d 269, 271-272 (1976) 
(merger doctrine rejected in felony murder context even when 
15 
.State v. Miniefield, was decided under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13-452, which preceeded Arizona's current first degree murder 
statute, § 13-1105. The felony murder provision of § 13-452 did 
not include the "and in furtherance of such offense" language 
in the comparable provision of § 13-1105 (see 
subsection (A) (2)). Thus, Miniefield may have been decided 
Jifferently had the current law been in effect. v. 
liallman, 137 Ariz. 31, 38, 668 P.2d 874, 881 <1983). However, 
the analysis in Miniefield is applicable to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
5-202(1) (d) <1978) which does not contain similar "and in 
furtherance of n language. 
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underlying felony is intergral part of homicide) . 16 
These cases provide considerable support for the 
conclusion that under § 76-5-202(1) (d), which draws no 
distinction between felonies that are independent of murder and 
those that are not, one commits first degree murder if the 
murder is committed during the commission of any one of several 
enumerated felonies, even if the underlying felony is an 
integral part of, or merely incidental to, the murder. The 
language of § 76-5-202(1) (d) should be read literally, not 
narrowly as did the .GL..e.e.n court in construing a similar 
provision under California law, in the absence of some 
indication that the legislature intended for it to be read 
otherwise. ..s..e.e. State y. Fontana, Utah, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046 
(1984) (Court has "statutory duty to construe the provisions of 
the Criminal Code 'according to the fair import of their terms 
to promote justice and to effect the ••• general purposes of 
section 76-1-104'"); Granite School District y. Salt Lake 
Utah, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (1983) ("terms of a statute 
are used advisedly and should be given an interpretation and 
application which is in accord with their usually accepted 
meanings"); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-106, 76-1-104 (2) & (3) 
16 Although Utah's first degree murder statute differs from the 
comparable statutes in Arizona and Georgia, it is significant 
that the felony murder provisions in the latter two states' 
statutes - ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-1105(A) (2) (Supp. 1984); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-l(c) (1982))--are similar to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§76-5-202(1) (d) in that the violation of each makes a defendant 
eligible for the death penalty. Further proceedings are then 
held to determine sentence. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 
(Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 & 31 (1982); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1983). 
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, 1'1 1 8). This was precisely the conclusion arrived at 
Ala. Crim. App., 436 So. 2d 883, 904-905 <1983), which 
lwld that it was not apparent from the plain reading of 
Afrtbama's first degree murder statute that the legislature 
intended for that statute to apply only to cases "where the 
burglary 'was unrelated to and not for the purpose of the 
killing itself'". 
Interpreting § 76-5-202(1) (d) to include knowing or 
intentional killings while the actor is engaged in any of the 
enumerated felonies, when the underlying felony is an integral 
part of, or merely incidental to, the homicide, is consistent 
with "potential constitutional considertions and legislative 
intent." State y. Wood, 648 P.2d at 83. As already noted, this 
interpretation does not appear to violate any constitutional 
provisions. And, when subsection (d), of § 76-5-202 ( ll is read 
in context with the other "aggravating" circumstances contained 
in subsections (a)-(h) (which in 1983 were expanded to include 
other aggravating circumstances -- see § 76-5-202(1) (a)·-(q) 
!Supp. 1983)), the fairest and most reasonable interpretation of 
subsection (d), as it is written, is that proposed above. 
Certainly, this state's legislature could have reasonably 
determined that the commission of any of the enumerated felonies 
for the purpose of committing a murder (when, of course, the 
•,tony could be committed for that purpcse) constitutes a 
c\rcumstance of sufficient aggravation to warrant consideration 
for the death penalty. The societal interest in being free from 
Lhat conduct is at least as great as those interests appurtenant 
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to the other aggravating circumstances listed in § 76-5-202(1). 
.lil.anS!lr 373 A.2d at 888. If the legislature had intended to 
limit subsection Cd) to those situations where the murder is 
committed to further an independant felony, it could easily have 
used "in furtherance of" language similar to that used in 
Arizona's first degree murder statute (quoted at p. 51, . 
.c.f.. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020 Cl983J .1 7 
B. 
Defendant further contends that he could not be 
convicted of first degree murder for an intentional homicide 
committed while engaged in the commission of a burglary. He 
argues that because a burglary is a completed offense "the 
moment entry is made with the requisite felonious intent" 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 77) , it could not provide the basis, in 
his case, for elevating a subsequent intentional killing to 
first degree murder. 
However, this notion has been widely rejected in the 
felony murder context where burglary is considered a 
17 Washington's aggravated first degree murder statute states in 
pertinent part: 
A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if he 
or she commits first degree murder as defined by RCW 
9A.32.030Cl) (a), as now or hereafter amended, and one or more of 
the following aggravating circumstances exist: 
(9) The murder was committed in the course of, in 
furtherance of, or in immediate flight from one of the following 
crimes: ... 
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,,,,,11tinuing" offense. State y, Dudrey, 30 Wash. App. 
,,;. 450, 635 P.2d 750, 753 <1981); y. Ricbmond, 112 Ariz. 
•2n, 232, 540 P.2d 700, 704 (1975). This conclusion applies 
to burglary charged as an aggravating circumstance under 
§ 76-5-202(1) (d). Richards y. Marin County Superior Court, 
194 Cal. Rptr. 120, 126 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1983). Finally, the 
evidence clearly supported a finding that defendant committed an 
intentional homicide while engaged in the commission of a 
burglary, which is defined in Utah as "enter[ingl or remain[ingl 
in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any 
person." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202(1) (1978). y. 
252 Ga. 227, 241, 314 S. E. 2d 83, 96 (1984); State y. 
fu:.G..u.i..r.., 131 Ariz. 93, 96, 638 P.2d 1339, 1342 (198ll. 
POINT VI 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2) (Supp. 1983) IS 
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS THE 
JURY TO CONSIDER ANY FACTS IN AGGRAVATION 
DURING THE PENALTY HEARING. 
In Point VIII of his brief <Appellant's Brief at pp. 
78-82), defendant argues that UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 ( 2) 
(Supp. 1983) 18 is constitutionally defective because it fails to 
limit the aggravating factors that can be considered by the jury 
during penalty phase. Defendant bases this argument on the 
uremise that consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors 
18 
Section 76-3-207 was amended in 1982. Those amendments became 
effective on February 16, 1982, prior to the date of defendant's 
c·rime. 1982 Utah Laws, ch. 19, § 1. 
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(i.e., "any other facts in aggravation" (§ 76-3-207(2)) by the 
jury in determining penalty is unconstitutional. He claims that 
error therefore occurred when the State was allowed to introduce 
evidence of his criminal record at penalty hearing. 
Section 76-3-207(2) provides: 
In these sentencing proceedings, evidence 
may be presented as to any matter the court 
deems relevant to sentence, including but not 
limited to the nature and circumstances of 
the crime, the defendant's character, 
background, history, mental and physical 
condition, and any other facts in aggravation 
or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence 
the court deems to have probative force may 
be received regardless of its admissibility 
under the exclusionary rules of evidence. 
The state's attorney and the defendant shall 
be permitted to present argument for or 
against sentence of death. Aggravating 
circumstances shall include those as outlined 
in 76-5-202 •.• 
Given the way that section is written, it appears that any 
aggravating factor related to "the nature and circumstances of 
the crime, the defendant's character, background, history, land] 
mental and physical condition" can be called a "statutory 
aggravating factor." "Any other facts in aggravation of 
the penalty" are "non-statutory aggravating factors." This is 
a somewhat different statutory scheme from that in Florida, for 
example, where specific aggravating factors are enumerated by 
statute for consideration at penalty phase. .s..e.e_ FLA. STAT. § 
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cu I .141 ( 1983) . 19 Because a defendant's criminal record 
.tu; to "the defendant's character, background, [and] 
,.;,,tocy," it is logically categorized as a statutory aggravating 
rather than a non-statutory aggravating factor. 
Therefore, it appears defendant lacks standing to challenge that 
part of § 76-3-207(2) that allows consideration of "any facts in 
aggravation." .s..e.e. Ho:tle y. Monson, Utah, 606 P.2d 240, 242 
(1982) ("An attack on the validity of a statute cannot be made by 
parties whose interests have not been prejudiced by the 
operation of the statute."); State y. Jordan, Utah, 665 P.2d 
1280, 1284 (1983) • 20 
Even if it were assumed, arguendo, that a defendant's 
criminal record falls within "any facts in aggravation" (non-
statutory aggravating factors), and that defendant therefore has 
standing to challenge § 76-3-207(2) on the basis that it fails 
to limit the aggravating factors the sentencing body may 
consider, his argument is without merit. Barcla:t y. Florida, 
19 In Florida, specific statutory aggravating factors are 
considered only at penalty phase, rather than at both guilt and 
penalty phase, as is the scheme in Utah. .s..e.e. §§ 76-5-202; 76-3-
207(2). Under Florida law, all premeditated murder and certain 
types of felony murder are eligible for death penalty 
consideration • .s..e.e. FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (1983). 
2° Furthermore, if defendant is attempting to argue that his 
criminal record should not have been introduced by the State 
because he gave notice that he would not argue lack of criminal 
record as a mitigating circumstance, such an argument is 
in light of the recognition in Zant y, Stephens, 
u.s._, 103 s.ct. 2733, 2747-2748 (1983), that a defendant's 
criminal record may be properly considered during a capital 
0entencing hearing as an aggravating factor. 
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_u.s._, 103 s.ct. 3418, 3433 (1983), makes clear that 
consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors is not 
prohibited by the United States Constitution. Nor is there any 
reason to conclude that the Utah Constitution is any more 
restrictive in this regard. Significantly, numerous state 
courts have adopted the Barclay position in interpreting their 
sentencing statutes and state constitutional requirements. .s.e.e., 
.e.....g_._, State y. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396, 402 (1983); 
People y. Kqbat, Ill. 447 N.E.2d 247, 277 (1983); State y. 
La., 422 So.2d 95, 103-104 (1983) • .iS..e.e ..a.l...s..o Alvord y. 
Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1284-1286 (11th Cir. 1984); Barfield 
y. Harris, 719 F.2d 58, 59-61 (4th Cir. 1984); Henry y. 
Wainwright, 721 F.2d 990, 994 (5th Cir. 1983), 104 
S.Ct. 2374 (affirming in part and reversing in part Henry y. 
Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56, the decision cited by defendant in 
support of his argument -- see Appellant's Brief at p. 80). 
Interestingly, the "any other facts in aggravation" 
language suggests that introduction of evidence not specifically 
related to the circumstances of the crime and the 
characteristics of the defendant is permissible. It might be 
argued that this unconstitutionally broadens the evidence in 
aggravation that the state may introduce. However, that 
language should be read to allow only the introduction of 
evidence in aggravation that contributes to a more informed 
sentencing decision • .c.f.. California y. Ramos, _U.S._, 103 
S.Ct. 3446 (1983) (holding that the Federal Constitution does 
not prohibit an instruction permitting a capital sentencing jury 
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to consider the Governor's power to commute a life sentence 
1ttiout possibility of parole). This would be consistent with 
:" llnited States Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of the 
tullowing statement made in Gregg y. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
I 1976) : 
"We think that the Georgia court wisely has 
chosen not to impose unnecessary restrictions 
on the evidence that can be offered at such a 
hearing and to approve open and far-ranging 
argument. • . • So long as the evidence 
introduced and the arguments made at the 
presentence hearing do not prejudice a 
defendant, it is preferable not to impose 
restrictions. We think it desirable for the 
jury to have as much information before it as 
possible when it makes the sentencing 
decision." 428 U.S., at 203-204, 96 s.ct., at 
2939. 
Zant v. Stephens, _u.s._, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2748 <1983). 
POINT VII 
DEFENDANT'S DEATH SENTENCE WAS NOT DISPROPOR-
TIONATE ON ANY OF THE GROUNDS HE ALLEGES. 
In Point V of his brief (Appellant's Brief at pp. 56-
64), defendant raises three distinct proportionality of sentence 
issues. Each will be dealt with separately. 
First, defendant contends that because his crime does 
not rise to the level of extreme and unusually serious and 
shocking crimes, the death sentence in his case was 
disproportionate. Although this Court has a duty in reviewing a 
rlealh sentence to determine whether that sentence was 
1iisproportionate, State v. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71, 77 <1982) 
c.e.r_t. 459 U.S. 988, the facts of this case are 
sufficiently egregious to justify the verdict. 
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"[Tlhe standards which guide the sentencing body must 
focus on the circumstances of the crime as well as the back-
ground and personal characteristics of the defendant." l'i.QQ.d, 
648 P.2d at 77 • ..s..e_e ..iil..s.Q Barclay v. Florida, 103 
s.ct. 3418, 3433 (1983). The jury in the instant case had 
before it evidence of defendant's stealthily committed burglary 
of the victim's residence, during which defendant bludgeoned the 
victim's head with an ax before setting the latter's bed and 
body on fire. Based upon this evidence, evidence of defendant's 
substantial prior criminal record, and a significant lack of 
mitigating evidence, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that total aggravation outweighed total mitigation, and was also 
persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the 
death penalty was justified and appropriate in the 
circumstances. .£e..e. Instruction No. 11 (contained in Appendix 
648 P.2d at 83. 
In l'i.QQ.d the Court stated: 
These standards require that the sentencing 
body compare the totality of the mitigating 
against the totality of the aggravating 
factors, not in terms of the relative numbers 
of the aggravating and the mitigating 
factors, but in terms of their respective 
substantiality and persuasiveness. 
Basically, what the sentencing authority must 
decide is how compelling or persuasive the 
totality of the mitigating factors are when 
compared against the totality of the 
aggravating factors. The sentencing body, in 
making the judgment that aggravating factors 
"outweigh," or are more compelling than, the 
mitigating factors, must have no reasonable 
doubt as to that conclusion, and as to the 
additional conclusion that the death penalty 
is justified and appropriate after 
considering all the circumstances. This 
means that upon consideration of all of the 
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circumstances relating to this defendant and 
this crime the sentencing authority must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
death penalty should be imposed. 
648 P.2d at 83-84 . ..s..e..e. Instruction No. 11 (Appendix B). 
Because the most stringent burden of persuasion as required by 
jj_QQ_d was applied in this case, on review this Court should give 
the jury's verdict in penalty phase even greater deference than 
it may have given those verdicts in past capital cases where 
there was no well defined burden of persuasion in place. Unless 
the death sentence is clearly disproportionate in a given case, 
the jury's decision to impose that penalty should be upheld. As 
noted in Andrews y. Morris, Utah, 677 P.2d 81 (1983): 
There exists ••• a critical distinction 
between the reasonable doubt standard in 
guilt-innocence determinations and the degree 
of certitude standard in the penalty phase of 
a capital trial. The issue in petitioners' 
case was not whether the decision to impose 
the death penalty was accurate, but rather 
whether it was fairly made in the context of 
the circumstances of petitioners and their 
crimes. No measure of "accuracy" exists 
whereby that decision can be analyzed in the 
same way as the decision about whether a fact 
is true or false. "[S]entencing decisions 
rest on a far-reaching inquiry into countless 
facts and circumstances and not on the type 
of proof of particular elements that 
returning a conviction does." California y. 
_u. s._, 103 s. Ct. 3446, 3456 n. 21, 
77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (quoting Zant y. 
Stephens, _U.S._, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2756, 77 
L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)), (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
677 P.2d at 93. 
Given the facts of this case and defendant's prior 
criminal record, it cannot be said that the circumstances in 
this case were so unpersuasive or uncompelling that no 
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reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
total aggravation outweighed total mitigation and that the death 
penalty was appropriate. Moreover, defendant's suggestion that 
because his crime cannot be equated with those committed in 
state v. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977), .c..ell· .de.ni..e..d, 439 
U.S. 882 (1978), his death sentence is disproportionate, 
reflects a serious misreading of that case. This Court did not 
hold in the Pierre opinion, nor has it held in any of its 
subsequent decisions in capital cases, that an "episode of 
extreme cruelty, terror, and atrocity" like that perpetrated by 
the "Hi-Fi killers" is necessary before a death sentence is 
appropriate. Rather, the primary concern is that the decision 
to impose the death penalty "was fairly made in the context of 
the circumstances of [the defendant] and [hisl crime[]." 
Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d at 93. There is nothing to indicate 
that this standard was not met in defendant's case. 
Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
not allowing the jury to consider affidavits he submitted 
concerning the sentences imposed in other capital cases in Utah 
(R, 289-332, 1933). He claims that "[t]he affidavits would have 
allowed the jury to compare sentences in a more informed 
manner". Appellant's Brief at p. 63. 
This argument is nothing more than one for approval of 
the type of case-by-case comparison rejected by this Court in 
Andrews v. Morris, Utah, 607 P.2d 816, 825 (1980), .c..eil· .denie_d, 
449 U.S. 891, and again in Andrews y. Morris, 677 P.2d at 97-98. 
The only difference here is that defendant asks the jury to 
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'fl•je in case-by-case comparison instead of the judiciary. 
:I"'' e is no compelling reason to allow the jury to engage in the 
:;or t of comparative review this Court has rejected as 
inappropriate for itself. Moreover, it is now well settled that 
case-by-case proportionality review is not required under the 
Federal Constitution. Pulley v. Harris, _u.s._, 104 s.ct. 871 
11984). And, given the holding of the two Andrews y. Morris 
cases, comparative proportionaltiy review is not required under 
the Utah Constitution either. 
Finally, defendant contends that his death sentence 
was grossly disproportionate in light of the immunity granted by 
the State to Carla Sagers, an accomplice, in exchange for her 
testimony against defendant. He argues that the different 
treatment accorded Ms. Sagers renders his sentence 
unconstitutional because it was the product of arbitrariness and 
caprice. 
It is clear from Ms. Sager's testimony at trial, which 
the jury obviously believed (at least as far as it incriminated 
defendant), that she was not as culpable as was defendant for 
the killing of Mark Schoenfeld. Although the evidence indicated 
that Ms. Sagers was unlawfully in the victim's residence at the 
time of the killing and suggested to defendant that the victim's 
be set on fire to cover up the murder, it also showed that 
'he was not in the bedroom when defendant struck the victim with 
an ax and that she did not herself intend for Schoenfeld to be 
killed. It is against this factual background that the relevant 
:a::;e law should be analyzed. 
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Several cases have specif ic:il ly addressed the issuP 
defendant presents. In y. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43, 
62-63 (1983), the court held that it was not unconstitutional to 
grant immunity to a co-defendant where the other defendant 
subsequently received a death sentence. Io reaching that 
conclusion the court stated: 
The argument of appellant is not unlike one 
advanced by petitioner Gregg that the state 
prosecutor has unfettered authority to select 
those persons whom he wishes to prosecute or 
to plea bargain with. The Court, 428 U.S. at 
199, 96 S.Ct. at 2937, declared that the 
existence of these discretionary stages is 
not determinative, but the specific 
individual convicted of a capital offense 
must be separately dealt with in the decision 
to impose the death penalty; there is nothing 
unconstitutional about affording mercy to an 
individual defendant. In other words, 
leniency in one case does not invalidate the 
death penalty in others. Justice White in 
his concurring opinion discussed this aspect, 
428 U.S. at 224-226, 96 S.Ct. at 2948-2949, 
where he declined to interfere with the 
manner in which Georgia chose to enforce its 
laws on the basis of a charge of lack of 
faith in its system. Accomplices in crime 
need not be sentenced alike; a sentence 
should be patterned to the individual 
defendant. Beaulieu v. State, Wyo., 608 P.2d 
275 (198); Daellenbach y. State, Wyo., 562 
P.2d 679 (1977). 
664 P.2d at 63. Similar conclusions were reached in State y, 
Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 76, 673 P.2d 1, 14 (1983), and .£alm.e..s 
v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1511, 1524 (llth Cir. 1984). These 
decisions are in accord with a general consensus in the courts 
that the imposition of different sentences on co-defendants in a 
capital case (e.g., one receives life and the other death) is 
not unconstitutional on that basis alone. • .e...J;4, Bassett y, 
fil.a.t.e, Fla., 449 So.2d 803, 809 ( 1984); State y. Willis, La., 
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1 :,,,. 2d 553, 558 ( 1983); Mincey y, State, 251 Ga. 255, 274, 
,1 s.E.2d 882, 897 (1983) (no constitutional violation where 
1 1osecutor waives death penalty for two of three co-defendants 
and seeks death penalty for the third). 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-3 (1982), a county 
attorney has "the power to grant transactional immunity from 
prosecution to any person who is intended to be called as a 
witness in behalf of the state whenever the .• , county 
attorney deems that the testimony of such person is necessary to 
the investigation or prosecution of such a case." In accordance 
with that statute, the prosecution granted immunity to Ms. 
Sagers (R. 8-9), who, based upon the evidence not 
kill, attempt to kill, or intend that the killing occur, 11 
not, unlike defendant, eligible for the death penalty. 
Enmund y, Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). Because Ms. Sagers was 
less culpable than defendant for the murder of Mark Schoenfeld 
and based upon the case law cited above, defendant's death 
sentence was not unconstitutionally imposed simply because 
immunity was granted to Ms. Sagers. 
POINT VIII 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANOTHER PENALTY 
HEARING BASED UPON ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER REMARKS 
BY THE PROSECUTOR CONCERNING THE LENGTH OF A 
LIFE SENTENCE. 
In Point IV of his brief (Appellant's Brief at pp. 53-
16!, defendant contends that in the penalty phase of his trial 
he was denied a meaningful comparison of a life sentence with a 
Jeath sentence due to remarks by the prosecutor that suggested a 
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life sentence actually would be one of only fifteen years 
confinement. He refers specifically to two remarks: 
I am sure we're all, to some degree or 
other, scholars of the Bible, the Mosiac law, 
the law of Christianity and all the rest of 
the factors Mr. Barber brought out in his 
closing remarks to you. And if I might for a 
moment indulge in that, in discussing a 
little of the Mosiac law yourself, you recall 
as the chosen, as they were called, were 
traveling through the wilderness, they were 
much like Elroy Tillman. They didn't heed 
the many miraculous instances of being saved, 
they were rotten and it took 40 years to 
purge their souls. Forty years, not fifteen 
years as a life imprisonment would mean. 
Forty years of humility and remorse and 
repentence and all the other things that 
characterize human beings. 
CR. 1973) (the specific remark challenged is underlined). 
Can you honestly say to yourselves 15 Y.eiil..S 
hence that a person showing the lack of 
remorse Mr. Tillman has shown is going to be 
a better person when he gets out or that he 
is not going to, as he said in the one 
statement to Lori Groneman, "Don't you know I 
will kill you, Bitch?" 
CR. 1977) (the specific remark challenged is underlined). 
However, it is difficult to find merit in defendant's 
argument when his own counsel first suggested that a life 
sentence may not actually result in confinement for life, and 
the prosecutor was merely responding to that suggestion. Prior 
to the prosecutor's "rejoinder," as defendant describes it 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 54), defendant's counsel had said in 
his argument: 
If one would have forecast the likelihood 
that Elroy would have got to 47 without 
having committed any homicides, if you had 
used Mr. Christensen's arguments, the figures 
as they existed in 1955, you would have said 
that could never happen. He will commit a 
violent offense right away. 
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Wel 1, he didn't. And even if your verdict 
is correct, the violence that he says was 
always implicit in this man's character never 
came forward until he was 47 years old. But 
he is 47 years old, ladies and gentlemen, he 
is not 30, and a life sentence, even in Utah 
which is relatively easy in the light 
sentence area, as I am informed to believe, 
is probably 15 or 20 years. 
The Elroy Tillman you see today is not the 
Elroy Tillman that will be released from 
prison if he is released from prison and 
paroled again, which is highly unlikely in 
the event of his record at the end of 15 or 
20 years. The man who is the threat about 
which Mr. Christensen has addressed to you so 
thoroughly is a 67-year-old man, not one of 
47. His body won't be in the condition that 
it is now. He will have spent 15 or 20 years 
in confinement. He will be broken and old 
and incapable of causing damage to anyone. 
That argument, ladies and gentlemen, is 
nonsense and you should disregard it. 
IR. 1953-1954). Clearly, a prosecutor may properly respond to 
remarks made by defense counsel in closing argument. State y, 
Williams, Utah, 656 P.2d 450, 454 (1982); State y, Gillies, 135 
Anz. 500, 510; 662 P.2d 1007, 1017 (1983). U. State y, Smith, 
Utah, 675 P.2d 521, 526 (1983) ("Improper remarks of defense 
counsel in closing argument do not justify improper, retaliatory 
statements by prosecution."). Given that defendant made no 
objection to the prosecutor's remarks at the penalty hearing and 
that the remarks were not in fact improper, defendant's request 
that his death sentence be vacated and his case remanded for 
another penalty proceeding should be denied. 
POINT IX 
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE REASON-
ABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AT THE GUILT 
AND PENALTY PHASES OF HIS TRIAL; FURTHERMORE, 
THOSE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
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INFIRM. 
In Point IX of his brief (Appellant's Brief at pp. 82-
84), defendant argues that the reasonable doubt instructions 
given at the guilt and penalty phases of his trial were 
constitutionally infirm and thus reversal of both his conviction 
and death sentence is required. 
Defendant advances this arguement even though the 
reasonable doubt instructions given at both phases were those he 
himself requested (Defendant's Requested Instruction No. R. 
148 (Appendix Cl ; Instruction No. 14, R. 193 (Appendix Al; 
Defendant's Requested Instruction R. 241-242 (Appendix 
Dl; Instruction No. 12, R. 276 (Appendix Bl l. Furthermore, he 
did not take exception at either phase to the reasonable doubt 
instructions given CR. 1852, 1979). Under these circumstances, 
defendant is not in a position to raise for the first time on 
appeal the issue of defective reasonable doubt instructions • 
.s.e._e State y. Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 190, 192-193 (1976). And, 
given that the instructions tendered do not appear to shift the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant, there is no reason to 
apply an exception to this general waiver rule. .s.e..e. State y. 
Utah, 604 P.2d 472, 474 (1979); .c.£. State y, 
Utah, 672 P. 2d 79, 81 ( 1983). 
CONCL!JS ION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
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¢ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of February, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVE B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney G neral 
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s:l-
400 South, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this cJ/ day 
of February, 1985. 
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ADDENDUM 
APPENDIX A 
tJO. /_ji' 
You are instructed that the clcfcnd<1nt 
witness in his own behalf and has the right to go upon the wH,, 
stand and testify if he chooses to do so. However, the law ex-
pressly provides that no presumption adverse to him is to arise 
the mere fact that he does not place himself upon the witness st, 
If he is satisfied with the evidence which has been given, there 
is no occasion for him to add thereto. 
So, in this case the mere fact that this defendant has· 
availed himself of the privilege which the law gives him should 
not prejudice him in any way. It should not be considered as 
any indication either of his guilt or of his innocence. The 
failure of the defendant to testify is not even a circumstance 
against him and no presumption of guilt can be indulged in the 
minds of the jury by reason of such failure on his part. 
1NSJRUCT10N NO. 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a reasonable 
doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled 
to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. / Now, by 
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on reason and one 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind 
and convinces the understanding pf those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from 
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
If after an impartial consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence in the case you can candidly say that you are not 
satisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt. 
But if after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction 
of the defendant's guilt such as you would be willing to act upon 
the more weighty and important matters relating to your own 
dfa1rs, you have no reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be 
a real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely possible or 
1 mag1nary. 
INSTRUCTION tm _ _/_ 5 
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the cha, 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder, First Degree, a Capital Offense,; 
contained in the Information. By the plea of not guilty the de-
fendant denies each and every one of the essential elements of 
charge, which elements are as follows: 
l. That on or about May 26, 1982, in Salt Lake County, St 0: 
of Utah, the defendant, Elroy Tillman, caused the death of Mark 
Schoenfeld; and 
2. That he acted intentionally or knowingly in causing 
death of Mark Allen Schoenfeld; and 
3. That at the time the homicide was committed, the defen-
dant was engaged in the commission of, or attempting to corrnnit 
burglary or aggravated burglary, and/or arson or aggravated arso:. 
If you find the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
each and every one of these elements, then it is your duty to fir. 
the defendant guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder 
First Degree, a Capital Offense. On the other hand, if you find 
the State has failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reas 
able doubt then you must find the defendant not guilty of the ofi, 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder, First Degree, a Capital Offense, a: 
you may then consider the lesser includeed offense of Criminal !! 
cide, Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony. 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO. /1 
You are instructed that you are to cornpRre the totaliL 
of the mitigating against the totality of the aggravating 
factors, not in terms of the relative numbers of the aggravating 
and the mitigating factors, but in terms of their respective 
substantiality and persuasiveness. What you must decide is how 
compelling or persuasive the totality of the mitigating factors 
are when compared against the totality of the aggravating 
factors. This requires that you must make two determinations: 
first, that the State has proved from the evidence and beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh, or 
are more compell"ing than the mitigating factors. Secondly, the 
State must prove from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the penalty of death is the only appropriate and just 
penalty in iight of all of the circumstances. 
(601) 35S-B998 
INSIRUCTION 
Reasonable doubt in the penalty phase means a doubt that is 
based on reason and one v.hich is reasonable in view of all of the evidence. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof vmich satisfies 
the mind and caovinces the tmderstanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upan it. doubt is a doubt vmich reasonable rren 
and wumen would entertain, and it 5t arise from your consideration and --1-eighing aggr:<J.yq_ting and 
il'.1i-_from the ev.!-denc;e or lack 
If after an impartial consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence in the case you can candidly say that you are not persuaded that_ 
the death penalty should be imposed, you have a reasonable doubt. But if 
after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the evidence you 
can truthfully say that you have been persuaded so as to have an abiding 
conviction thRt the death penalty is appropriate in this case, such as you 
would be willing to act upon in the rrore weighty and important matters 
relating to you have no reasonable doubt.\ A reasonable_ 
doubt must be a real, substantial doubt and not one that is IIErely possible 
or il!Eginary.\ 
APPENDIX C 
-
INSTRUlTJON NO. 
If there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of \i, 
de fend an t , t he n yo u mu s t a c q u i t h i m . A reason ab I e doubt me a 11 , 
a doubt that is based on reason, and it must be substantial 
rather than speculative. It must be sufficient to cause, 
reasonably prudent person to hesitate to act in the more 
important affairs of his life. If, after considering all oi 
t he e v i den c e i n the case , you have such a doubt i n your min; 
as would cause you or any other reasonably prudent person tc 
pause or hesitate before acting in a grave transaction in your 
own life, then you have such a doubt as the law contemplates 
as reasonable doubt. 
A reasonable doubt exists if, after careful and 
impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case, yoc 
do not feel convinced to a moral certainty that the defendant 
is guilty of the charge against him. The defendant is entitlec 
to every i n fer enc e i n h i s favor th a t can reason ab 1 y be d r a W' 
from the evidence. Where two inferences may be drawn from the 
same facts, one consistent with guilt and one consistent wilt 
innocence, the defendant is entitled to the inference that 11 
consistent with innocence. If the evidence merely creates \h, 
suspicion of the defendant's guilt or the thought that he' 
possibly or probably guilty, then there is a state of reasonaDI, 
d o u b t a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t i s en t i t 1 e d t o t he be n e f i t o f s u ,. , 
reasonable doubt, and you must find the defendant not guilt> 
A r e a s o n a b 1 e d o u b t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i 1 t may a r i s e f r om th· 
. 
APPENDIX D 
I NSTRUCr I ON NO. 
During that phase of the trial in which you determinerl 
the defendant's guilt, instructed you on the meaning of the 
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." That same standard 
of proof is applicable to these proceedings. 
have previously instructed you that the burden is 
upon the State to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances and that death will be the only approp;iate 
punishment for this defendant. By "reasonable doubt" is meant 
a do u b t t ha t i s b a s e d on r ea son and one wh i ch i s reason ab 1 e in 
view of all of the evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is that degree of proof which satisifes the mind and convinces 
the understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men 
and women would entertain, and it must arise from the evidence 
or lack of evidence in this case. 
After an impartial consideration and compairson of 
all the evidence in the case, if you can candidly say that you 
are not satisifed that the aggravating circumstances outweigh 
the mitigating circumstances and that death is the onlv 
appropriate and just punishment for the defendant, you have u 
reasonable doubt. But if after such impartial consideration 
and comparison of all the evidence you can truthfully say that 
you have an abiding conviction that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and that death is the 
2 
,11Jv appropriate and just punishment for this defendant, such 
"' you would be wi !ling to act upon in the more weighty and 
important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no 
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be a real, substantial 
doubt and not one that is merely possible or imaginary. 
APPENDIX E 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Horton II 
/K-'?J {: ?' !' (') 
THE STATE OF UTAH BAIL 
vs. 
ELROY TILLMAN (02/23/46) INFORMATION 
Crimingi N'f) 2 .. , 1 
. ,0 L,,,. '" '" 
Defendant (s). 
(Address/DOB) k 7 
The und..,signed _______ s_. _C_HA_P_MAN ___ ( S_L_C_P_D_) _______ __ 
und.., oath states on information and belief that the defendants committed the cnmes of: 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER FIRST DEGREE, a Capital Offense, at 
1560 South 1300 East, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
,'about May 26, 1982, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
·Section 202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that 
the defendant, ELROY TILLMAN, intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Mark Allen Schoenfeld, while said 
defendant was engaged in the commission of, or attempting 
to co"';"it, Burglary or Aggravated #'I-/ 
This information is based on evi-
dence obtained !Tom the following 
witnesses: 
S CHAPMA" · 
E. LYMAN 
M. VUYK 
LORI GROl,EMAN 
:..1,( 
/:' . . ' . 
I I . ];; 
(.%.Lcnbed anti sworn to before me this --
• ; I · day 19-
• /.). / •· _I 
:5'2 
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